MAY 1980
$1.50

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

VOLUME 32

1

Wage-Price Controls and the Working Class

THE EDITORS

Third World Industrialization — A New Panacea?

RAÚL FERNÁNDEZ

Criticizing Economic Democracy

BRUCE ANDREWS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS | VOLUME 32 NUMBER 1 MAY 1980

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: Wage-Price Controls and the Working Class by the Editors 1

THIRD WORLD INDUSTRIALIZATION: A NEW PANACEA? by Raúl Fernández 10

CRITICIZING ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY by Bruce Andrews 19

BOOKS: A Synthesis of Dependency and Class Analysis by Andrew Zimbalist 27

Women and the Hegemony of the Experts by Christine Stansell 33

CORRESPONDENCE: East Timor: The Final Solution? by Pat Flanagan 41

I. What's With China's Uninterrupted Revolution? by O. Robertson 48

II. Is China's "Uninterrupted Revolution" a Marxist Revolution? by Harry Grundfest 56

III. Mark Selden Responds 57

MONTHLY REVIEW (ISSN 0027 0520): Published monthly except July and August, when bimonthly, and copyright © 1980, by Monthly Review, Inc. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS: 62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.
Telephone: (212) 691-2555.
Europe: R. Handyside, 47 Red Lion Street, London WC1R 4PF.
Telephone: 01-242-3501. Giro Account No. 557 6350.
MR Edizione Italiana; viale Oracio Flacco 15, Bari 70124.
Telephone: 241919, 246157.
MR Greek Edition: Zoodochou Pighis 17 (2nd floor), Athens 145, Greece.
Revista Mensual/Monthly Review: Vallfogona, 40-baixos, Barcelona 12, Spain.
Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped self-addressed envelope.

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTOR: B. De Boer, Inc., 113 E. Centre Street, Nutley, N.J. 07110.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: U.S.: One year $15, students $11; foreign $18, students $13; Libraries and Institutions: U.S. $24; foreign $26. Additional Postage: First Class (U.S. and Canada) $6; Airmail: Central America and Mexico $9; South America and Europe $12; Middle East, Greece, Asia, Africa and Australia $14.

EDITORS: Paul M. Sweezy Harry Magdoff Leo Huberman (1903-1968)

ASSOCIATE EDITOR: Bobbye Ortiz

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Volume 1, Number 1 of MONTHLY REVIEW appeared in May 1949, which means that this issue marks the 31st anniversary of the magazine's founding. As on previous anniversaries we acknowledge with gratitude the loyal support of our readers without which it would have been impossible to maintain publication of a completely independent Marxist socialist periodical over such a long period of time and often under difficult conditions.

In this connection we are pleased to report the results of this year's Monthly Review Associates annual appeal from September (when the appeal letter was mailed) through January. In that period the number of subscribers joining the Associates increased by 20 percent, and total

(Continued on inside back cover)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS AND THE WORKING CLASS

We recently (end of March) received the following letter addressed to the editors of MR:

I am a steelworker in Gary, Indiana. I have been a sustainer of MONTHLY REVIEW for three years now, and consider the magazine to be the best Marxist journal in the United States. I say this because to me it exemplifies the material dialectical method of Marx to a greater extent than any other journal that I know. Equally important, it is written in a style that is both logical and understandable to someone who grasps the rudiments of Marxism but is ignorant of the academic debates around various fine points of the science.

While at work I have the opportunity to talk with quite a few workers. I find that most of them are fed up with bourgeois politics and its practitioners. But out of a lack of alternatives, they turn to this or that bourgeois politician as the "least bad" or, optimistically, as a "possible bright spot." I have found that the current presidential primary race along with the issues of inflation and plant closings are the things most discussed in the political arena. This current interest in national political issues offers a good opportunity to discuss the "answers" provided by the various presidential candidates to the problems plaguing this country.

Generally, my approach is to state that none of the "answers" put forward by the bourgeois politicians can work in the long run, and increasingly even in the short run. I go on to point to the structural and political causes of inflation, such as monopoly power, the growing dependence on credit to forestall a recession, the growing military budget (also worsening unemployment), and the flood-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing of other countries with dollars which was accelerated during the Vietnam war. I then go on to point out that none of the politicians are proposing to do anything meaningful about these basic causes because they are wedded to the system of private profit. There are two weak points in my argument. When confronted with the argument that strictly enforced wage-and-price controls would mean an immediate freeze to the wild fluctuations in the economy, my response has been to point out that it *didn't* work in the early seventies and it is generally antithetical to the system. Because of my own theoretical vagueness on this point, it is impossible to convince someone that wage-and-price controls *can't* work. My other weak point concerns an adequate response to the idea that what we need is a war to bring the economy around again the way the Second World War did with regard to the depression of the 1930s. I point out that the huge amount of military spending is only a short-term answer and that without a perpetual continuation of war the economy would again slide back to its prewar situation. This argument is unconvincing, given the history of the two decades following the Second World War.

I would like to see MONTHLY REVIEW take up the causes of inflation and why none of the answers offered by the bourgeois politicians can correct it. I especially need to know why wage-and-price controls *can't* work, and why a war (neglecting the moral argument) is not an option for the working class. If you can refer me to some literature dealing with these questions, please do so. If there is no literature available, would the editors of MR please take up this subject in a coming issue or else respond to me individually. In any case, the sooner this is done the better, because peoples' minds are open to non-bourgeois ideology to a greater extent now during the farce which is paraded before their eyes every night in the form of presidential electioneering.

Yours in Struggle,
Bruce M. Brackney

We are glad to accept Bruce Brackney's challenge. In attempting to answer difficult questions like these, however, we recognize that the written medium has serious drawbacks. A give-and-take dialog would produce better results since it would enable both parties to reduce misunderstanding and/or provide explanations in a timely fashion. Since this is impossible, we can only suggest that readers write us their reaction to what follows, with specific requests for clarification or elaboration where you think it is needed. We feel very strongly that MR's most im-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portant function is to present ideas and arguments in a form useful to those actively engaged in the class struggle. To perform this function, however, we need your close and continuing collaboration.

THE EDITORS REPLY

As we see it, the workers must fight for *effective* controls, which means control over profits as well as prices and wages. But this, it must be clear, can only be a defensive action to protect the interests of the working class. It would be folly to imagine that such controls can cure the disease of inflation and depression.

The reason wage-and-price controls cannot eliminate inflation is that they do not tackle its underlying causes, which are rooted in the very nature of monopoly capitalism. Nor could even the most drastic controls eliminate fluctuations in the economy. The business cycle has been a constant and integral part of capitalist history—in both inflationary and noninflationary times. This stems from the anarchic nature of capitalism. The anarchy of the marketplace creates the conditions for cyclical ups and downs in the period of monopoly as well as competitive capitalism.

It is true that large corporations have developed sophisticated techniques to plan the operations of the industrial and financial empires they control. Such planning, however, has never been able to overcome periodic fluctuations in production and employment. In fact, one of the uses of internal capitalist planning has been to find ways of protecting profits during business declines, largely by shifting the burdens to workers and small business. From the standpoint of the present discussion, the important point is that no matter how big and powerful these giant corporations may be, they must struggle against other giants in the market place and cannot escape from the laws of capitalist competition and accumulation. Because of this there is a recurrent tendency for the growth of excess capacity relative to the ability of consumers to buy and to the willingness of capitalists to invest when profit-making opportunities decline. All of this, as already noted, happens whether inflation is rampant or not.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Various techniques have of course been devised to bolster demand to cope with overaccumulation and excess capacity—measures ranging from government deficit spending to promotion of the use of business and consumer credit. But when expansionary policies of this kind are pursued during a period of rising prices such as we have been living through since the beginning of the Vietnam war, their unavoidable consequence is to accelerate the inflationary spiral.

The truth is that U.S. capitalism has become trapped in an inflation that breeds more inflation and while this self-reinforcing process has cut into the standard of living of large sections of the population, it has also resulted in the build-up of vast sums of money in the treasuries of corporations and individual capitalists. Faced with a tapering off of the forces that supported the long wave of postwar prosperity and with an overaccumulation of capital goods, the ever-present drive for still more profits has found its outlet in price manipulation, stocking-up of inventories in anticipation of further price increases, and outright speculation in real estate, commodity markets, foreign exchange, etc. The accumulation of capital in this sort of economic environment has shifted from investment in industrial capacity to direct expansion of money capital by playing the treacherous games of inflation and speculation.

The capitalists are well aware that the flight into speculation, the accompanying explosion of debt, and uncontrollable inflation carry great risks to the stability of the banks and other financial institutions. The near panic among government officials, bankers, and stockbrokers touched off by the recent debacle in the silver market is but one of the signs pointing to the possibility of a major financial collapse. But as much as they may be aware of the perils, they cannot resist feeding the flames that can lead to economic ruin for themselves and others. They are driven along this road because their god and master is the drive for profits. And as their situation gets more and more desperate, the only way they can see out of the impasse is to reach for greater security at the expense of the mass of the people: by lowering real wages, imposing greater discipline and increased speed-up in the workplace, and reducing expenditures on social welfare.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this kind of world, it would be sheerest folly for workers to fall into the trap of thinking that there are gimmicks by which the U.S. economy—enmeshed in a crisis-ridden world economy, beset by recession, inflation, speculation, and gyrating financial markets—can be set right. There is only one really basic issue and that is, who is going to bear the brunt of the resulting burdens. Since for the capitalists there is only one road—to take it out of the hide of the people—the overriding concern of the working class must be to mobilize its power of self-defense.

It is in this context that the question of price controls should be viewed. Workers must of course continue to fight for wage increases that will at the very least keep up with rising living costs. But that is far from sufficient. Except in a few industries, the wage increases that workers have been able to obtain have trailed behind the advance in the prices of basic necessities. Moreover, even where wage gains have kept up with spiralling living costs, they still do not help the workers who are laid off or lose their jobs as a result of total plant shutdowns, the youth who are excluded from the labor market, the large pool of unemployed in prosperity as well as depression, the aged and the handicapped whose support falls increasingly on their working relatives.

In short, what we have is so much inflation-caused suffering that some sort of relief in the form of seriously enforced price controls is imperative. This, it must be stressed, is *not* to save the economy or eliminate fluctuations. Some businesses in fact will doubtless be hurt by effective price controls.* But this is certainly no excuse for doing nothing to relieve the misery and suffering which the present inflationary process is inflicting on the vast majority of the workers and their dependents. For them there can be only one meaningful question: Who is to receive a measure of protection—we or they?

Here, we come to the crux of the matter. The inherent weakness of a program of price controls is the reluctance of a capitalist government to interfere with profits—the holy of holies. This aversion is masked by worship of the market place: price

* For example, firms that have accumulated inventory in the expectation of continuing price increases or have borrowed money in the hope of paying it back in depressed dollars tomorrow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adjustments, it is alleged, must continually be permitted even under a control program to avoid the disruption and distortion of markets—as if there ever had been a free and neatly meshed network of markets of the kind described in the textbooks. On top of this, price control is discredited by appeals to popular aversion to bureaucracy and bureaucrats, which are indeed essential to an effective system of price controls.

When it comes to wage controls, on the other hand, matters are different. No delicate market-inspired adjustments are needed. Nor is there any need to rely on big bureaucracies since the bosses are willing enforcers of such controls. The inevitable ruling-class logic was baldly put in a recent *New York Times* editorial. Conceding that "the present inflation does demand a new policy response," the *Times* continued:

> The nation has lost real income from rising energy prices and diminishing productivity. Accelerating inflation is a futile and costly way to pay for these losses. The better way is to focus the national effort on two fronts: A substantial reduction in federal spending and a form of wage controls that contains inflation with a minimum of bureaucratic interference.
>
> To bring down the inflation rate, the nation will have to live with some kind of controls for a long time. This means they need to strike first at wages—and through them at prices—because long-term price controls ruin the economy. (February 27, 1980)*

There is no pretense here. Prices are hard to control; long-term price regulation is bad for the economy; and bureaucratic enforcement agencies are intrinsically evil. Hence, freeze wages, which presumably is relatively easy to do, and hope that price increases will thereafter be moderated. Control over profits are not even contemplated. Nor is this all. The federal budget must be severely cut. The *Times* does not bother to distinguish between the military and social-welfare parts of the budget. But in light of the well-known ruling class (and the *New York Times*) concern with the need for a strong military posture, it is clear that what is meant by "a substantial reduction in federal spending" is a further cut in expenditures for unemployment

---

* See "Inflation Without End" (MR, November 1979), for a very different view of what lies behind the inflation wave; and "Productivity Slowdown: A False Alarm" (MR, June 1979), for an analysis of the phoney productivity argument.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

benefits, education, health, housing, and assistance to near-bankrupt cities.

This is the program labor has to face up to, a program that can be defeated only if there is clear recognition that at bottom the issue is one of power. Workers would have to be adamant in refusing even to consider any concessions on wage controls until there is adequate assurance of vigorous enforcement of a price and profit freeze (including interest, dividends, rent, etc.). Finally, and above all, they can no longer hide from the fact that lasting gains will be impossible to achieve unless they learn how to mobilize and bring to bear their enormous potential *political* power. Failing that, capital will impose its own program which may not be a "solution" even from capital's point of view but will most certainly be a disaster for labor.

The second question raised in Bruce Brackney's letter is "why a war (neglecting the moral argument) is no option for the working class."

Focusing attention on the economic aspects, we must first examine the question in the context of the times. Spending for war will under certain conditions pull an economy up, while under others it will cause major disruptions. The experience of the Second World War cannot be taken as an indication of what would happen today. Before that conflict the United States was practically self-sufficient in most basic resources. A surplus of oil and copper was available for export; there was enough lead to meet civilian requirements; and only a tiny proportion of needed iron ore and zinc had to be imported. During the war years residential construction and civilian auto production were restricted, and energetic enforcement of price controls enabled the working class to accumulate savings that might otherwise have evaporated. The result was an enormous build-up of effective demand for housing and consumer durables, and a consequent expansion of capacity to satisfy this demand.

The situation today is very different in all these respects. Real income of consumers has been declining because of the price spiral. The consumer market for durable goods is propped up by ever-larger injections of installment credit. Instead of a working class with savings, we have a working class heavily in debt. In place of relative self-sufficiency in basic minerals, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States has become a heavy importer of oil, copper, iron ore, and other minerals. In today's world, military expenditures can only add to already existing inflationary pressures.

In addition we need to remind ourselves that even though military spending helped maintain U.S. prosperity during the postwar decades, it by no means eliminated recurrent recessions. Nor should we lose sight of the role played by the Vietnam war in triggering the runaway inflation that began in the late 1960s. The sum and substance of all this is that if the United States now engaged in limited wars the result would be aggravated shortages of natural resources, a new wave of inflation, and destruction of what is left of the dollar's international value. Unfortunately we cannot conclude that Washington will curtail its militarist and imperialist activities. What we can conclude, however, is that the economic effects of such actions, especially if waged on the scale of the Vietnam war, would be disastrous. As for bigger wars, surely everyone knows that in the age of the hydrogen bomb they would destroy not only the economy but most of the people as well.

The very fact that the possible economic benefits of war comes up for debate at all is an indication of how dangerous and evil the capitalist system has become. The historic contribution of capitalism has been the rapid development of productive forces. We can now see that it has long since outlived this usefulness. True, technological advances keep piling up. But along with them and the continued expansion of capitalism come the potential destruction of the biosphere, the exhaustion of the earth's natural resources, and the ever growing threat of nuclear disaster. What we are now facing is quite literally a race between revolution to save the world and the perpetuation of a bankrupt capitalism that will destroy the world. We can only hope that there is still time for this truth to be grasped and acted on before it is too late.

(April 15, 1980)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

build a socialist library at half-price

by joining

MONTHLY REVIEW ASSOCIATES

Membership entitles you to:

- *A discount of 50% off the list price* of any MR Press book. A $16 book for $8, or a $5.95 paperback book for half price, represents a considerable saving—enough to enable you to buy twice as many books.
- A one-year subscription to MONTHLY REVIEW (if you are already a subscriber we renew your sub automatically).
- A free copy of one of the following new MR Press titles: *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa* by Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane (list price: $18.50/£10·75); *Wasi'chu: The Continuing Indian Wars* by Bruce Johansen and Roberto Maestas (list price: $15.00/£8·00); *Class Struggles in the USSR; Second Period, 1923-1930* by Charles Bettelheim (list price: $18.95; not available as a choice for Associates in England or the Commonwealth countries).

Help MR Press become an effective press of the Left; help the magazine extend its influence; and help yourself to some important books by joining the Associates now.

Monthly Review Associates 62 W. 14th St. N.Y., N.Y. 10011

I enclose $..... Please enroll me as an MR Associate.

Please send me the free book of my choice from the list above:

.....

☐ I am already a subscriber.
Check category below

☐ $ 35-$49; £20·50 - £27·50 Supporting Associate
☐ $ 50-$99; £28·50 - £56 Sustaining Associate
☐ $100 and over; £57 and over Foundation Associate

Name .....

Street .....

City ..... State ..... Zip .....

Please make check payable to Monthly Review Associates.

Those who wish to pay in sterling should remit to Monthly Review
47 Red Lion Street, London WC1R 4PF, England
(Giro Account No. 557 6350)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THIRD WORLD INDUSTRIALIZATION: A NEW PANACEA?

BY RAÚL FERNÁNDEZ

Ever since the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974 and its Declaration and Action Program for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), there has been much analysis and debate as to the meaning for the developing countries of the Third World of this NIEO. Numerous articles, papers, and reports have addressed such topics as: the possible "de-industrialization" of the advanced capitalist countries, the future of the process of accelerated indebtedness of many Third World countries, etc., all in the context of the so-called "new international division of labor."[1]*

The call for an NIEO was followed by other meetings such as the Lima Conference on Industrial Development in mid-1975, sponsored by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) which brought out more specific declarations about the prospects for future industrial development of the Third World.

In the four years since the Lima Conference there has developed a "new orthodoxy" among technocrats and government officials in Latin America which foresees the coming of an intense period of industrialization for the nations of this hemi-

Raúl Fernández is a professor of economics at the Colegio de México, Mexico City.

* Notes will be found at the end of the article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sphere, and by extension for the other countries of the Third World. The speed with which transnational corporations introduced capitalist methods of production worldwide in the 1960s and early 1970s had already been noted and debated by Marxist writers even before the 1974 UN declaration.[2] What is new is the utilization of data discussed by Marxist writers in the early 1970s to buttress the rationale for current industrial plans in several Latin American countries.[3] The purpose of this article is to provide an overview and critique of the new orthodoxy of "growth through exports of manufactures" which is gaining ground in official circles in Latin America.

The Argument Summarized

Very briefly, the new current of thinking is based upon an analysis of two sets of conditions: those prevailing in the advanced capitalist countries and those characterizing the Third World situation. According to this view, conditions in the advanced countries which favor a "redeployment" of industrial activities—i.e., the transfer of certain manufacturing operations to the Third World—are fairly obvious.

First of all, for several years these countries have experienced a severe unemployment problem; the introduction of new technologies and capital equipment in some fields—usually considered to be a basic way to stimulate a spurt of growth in the economy—would only aggravate the problem of unemployment and would therefore be politically unfeasible in the short run. Second, the advanced countries suffer increasingly from a lack of natural resources basic for their industrial structure. Third, from the point of view of private capital the absence of cheap labor, or rather, the existence of a labor force accustomed to a fairly high standard of living, is a fundamental drawback to the industrial resurgence of these countries. Lastly, the spread of "Naderism" with its emphasis on measures to reduce environmental pollution has tended to put added pressure on the profitability of large capitalist monopolies in these countries.

A redistribution of industrial activities to the Third World is seen, in this view, as not only possible but necessary and desirable as well. The necessity arises in part from the search for a way out of the extreme foreign indebtedness which prevails in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Third World (especially the non-oil producing countries). In some respects this heavy debt burden is the result of previous "models of development," specifically, in Latin America, the one known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI).

The policy of ISI was the essence of the analysis and prescription of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in the postwar period. In the ECLA view Latin America and other primary-commodity producers had ceased to benefit from free trade and the international division of labor. This was due to factors such as the slow growth in demand for primary goods which, coupled with inflation in the industrialized countries, resulted in both a deterioration of the terms of trade and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties for most Latin American nations. A policy of favoring import-substitution through protective tariffs on industrial imports was taken to be the direct route to industrialization. After flourishing in the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the strategy of ISI was pronounced dead. ISI had failed in its goals, and economic conditions had become, if anything, worse than before: unemployment continued unabated; ISI industries failed to penetrate export markets; and dependence upon the export of primary products became intensified, since an increase in imports of semi-finished materials, spare parts, and machinery was needed to operate the ISI industries.

The application of ECLA policies did result in a kind of import substitution, but not the kind envisaged by the ECLA theorists. Before the spread of ISI, the flow of imports of finished goods from the advanced capitalist countries was precarious and unpredictable because of the recurring balance-of-payments problems in the Latin American nations. But during the expanding phase of the ISI, imports from the United States and other advanced capitalist countries were strong and persistent—to supply the machinery, spare parts, and industrial materials for the growing import-substitution industries. As a result, consumer products that had been imported for half a century or more were now produced domestically. The real substitution, however, was of one type of imports for another. The new flow of goods from the advanced capitalist countries was financed by foreign investment and by additional foreign debt, based on optimistic as-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sumptions about how much ISI could be sustained. In practice, it was not long before the new industries had gone through the phase of high growth rate, and new "bottlenecks" to development appeared in the form of "limited internal markets" which discouraged the further expansion of domestic industry. In the end, the Latin American countries were far deeper in debt, and a greater portion of their resources had to go to service debt and remit profits of foreign investors.

Under these circumstances a policy promising an alleviation of the debt situation, such as the production of manufactured goods for export would obviously be quite welcome. Such industrialization is regarded furthermore as desirable in itself due to beliefs (not necessarily valid) that only industrialization can lead to genuine self-reliance and a reduction of foreign dependence, and that the key to raising productivity and the rate of growth in an economy lies in the fast expansion of manufacturing industry.[4] Most importantly, the road to such industrialization is considered to be open because: (1) the countries of the Third World have abundant natural resources and cheap labor, elements which are the *sine qua non* of industrial expansion; (2) the previous decade had already demonstrated the feasibility of industrialization; and (3) despite the problems of the ISI policy, it had provided some countries of Latin America with enough infrastructure and technical know-how to sustain the trend of the preceding period.

Analysis of the Evidence

For some authors the evidence about recent trends in the world economy seems clear enough to enable them to speak not only of the "industrialization" of the Third World but also of the "de-industrialization" of the advanced capitalist world as well.[5] A summary of the strongest supporting arguments can be presented in four points: (1) The share of the Third World in world industrial production increased from 9 percent in 1955 to 12 percent in 1977. (2) The crude steel output of the underdeveloped countries increased from 2 percent of world steel production in 1950 to approximately 11 percent in 1977. (3) Relatively speaking, the growth was even more pronounced: industrial production in the period 1955-1974 expanded faster in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

underdeveloped countries (6.9 percent a year) than in the developed capitalist economies (5.0 percent a year). In two subsequent periods, 1970-1974 and 1972-1976, the respective growth rates of industrial production were 8.2 percent and 7.0 percent for the underdeveloped economies and 4.5 percent and 3.0 percent for the advanced capitalist countries. (4) The exports of manufactures from Third World countries have grown even more rapidly: from 1950 to 1977, the underdeveloped countries' share of the total manufactured imports of the most advanced capitalist countries increased by 50 percent, from 4.9 percent to 7.3 percent.[6]

There are important weaknesses both in the argument and in the evidence used to support it. While it is true that Third World countries possess cheap labor in abundance as well as strategic raw materials, both elements can rarely be found in one and the same country; for example, Hong Kong possesses lots of labor but hardly any natural resources. Furthermore, the mere presence of these elements cannot in itself be a theoretically significant argument, since the last hundred years (which coincide with the epoch of modern imperialism) have witnessed the exploitation of such resources to the advantage of imperialist countries.

The evidence can be criticized in several ways: (1) The industrialization reflected in the data occurred in half a dozen countries which include such *cities* as Singapore and Hong Kong, and small countries such as Taiwan and South Korea. Once the proportion of manufactured exports produced in these areas is subtracted, there is not much basis left on which to proclaim a clear-cut trend towards the structural transformation of Third World economies. (2) The industrialization has also been limited in that much of it has been of the "assembly" type—in the case of Mexico such assembly industry represents up to half of the recent (1975) manufactured exports.[7] (3) As far as foreign debt is concerned there is evidence that in the last few years the terms of trade of products manufactured in the Third World have deteriorated more than in the case of primary products.[8] To the extent that this is so, the ability of exports of manufactures to alleviate foreign debt burdens is limited. (4) The geographical pattern of exports associated with the recent spurt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of industrialization shows that it remains for the most part within the sphere of influence of one or another of the advanced capitalist countries. (5) Lastly, it can be shown that the recent growth in industrial exports from Third World countries is *not* very impressive from a global point of view; manufactured exports from the Third World represent a very small fraction of total manufactured exports, fluctuating between 0.5 percent and 2.0 percent.[9]

An Overview

The massive redistribution of capital investment (a true "big push") that is implied by the schemes of the supposed new international division of labor has not (or not yet) taken place, and what *has* occurred in terms of industrialization has to be qualified very carefully. Economic conditions in the advanced capitalist countries are of decisive importance to the future course of the process: for the present we have to note a strong trend toward protectionism in the advanced capitalist countries directed against manufactures from developing countries. Also to be raised is the question: *Who* will be the agents in charge of further industrialization? The new policy of industrial exports is supposed to remedy the evils brought about by the previous policy of ISI in Latin America. But it is crucial to recognize that transnational corporations (TNCs) have been the main actors in the new "manufactures for export" strategy, just as they were in the earlier ISI strategy. The "track record" of the TNCs is one of relying heavily on imports from their own various branches for their capital equipment and technical needs.[10] Thus, there is no guarantee that the currently proposed plans relying again on the TNCs will not have the same results as the policies of ISI. Broad programs of development and/or industrialization for areas as wide and diverse as Latin America usually suffer from an obvious and fatal weakness: they favor the countries with the economic and technical conditions best suited to their taking advantage of the new development strategy. For Latin America at the present juncture, U.S. monopoly capitalism—through its political and economic influence—seems to be in an excellent position to make the most of the opportunity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The current proposals are in great measure a response to the particular needs of some industrial branches in the advanced economies.[11] Such is the case, for example, with the steel industry which in the United States and other countries finds some of its operations to have become quite unprofitable. Some analysts take this as evidence that on a worldwide basis the center of production of Department I goods ("capital" goods) is moving toward the periphery and that this will soon lead to the need to reclassify Third World economies as primarily industrial capitalist, due to the high proportion of capital goods in their industrial output. This view is quite mechanical (and economistic) and fails to take into account that a capitalist economy is in constant flux: the key industries can and do vary from time to time. Steel, for example, is no longer the leading sector of capitalist production it once was.[12] In the words of the president of Mexico's state-owned Sidermex: "Steel is really a nineteenth-century activity. That's why you see the developed world falling back and the developing world moving into it."[13]

Thus, the idea of generalized industrialization needs to be further qualified as a real possibility for Latin America. Furthermore, it is important to keep the discussion not only at the level of the TNCs but also at the level of the national states as well, i.e., even the needs of one or another TNC may have to go unmet depending on the more general needs of the state. To date there seems to be no desire, at the level of the state in the advanced capitalist nations, to participate in major efforts designed to spur general industrial development of the Third World. That would be the proverbial killing of the goose that laid the golden egg.

Of the various proposed plans, Mexico has produced the most complete and sophisticated.[14] At the same time it is so ambitious as to raise serious questions as to its own authors' perceptions of the true possibilities of carrying it out. Mexico's plan purports to do (in the period 1979-1982) two things simultaneously: to eliminate the dependence on imports of capital goods brought about by ISI policies, and to begin to export capital goods—*from the same branches*. A rather tall order![15]

The appearance of this new twist in the economic plans of Latin American governments does not signify a complete break

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with past policies. On the contrary, ISI policies continue to be implemented, as well as the policy of regional integration in the Andean countries. Industrial development by way of a new international economic order, it seems, will benefit those foreign interests that are in a position to take advantage of the new opportunities. To the extent that further industrialization is shaped by TNC investments, it will not lead to the *independent* economic development of these countries. A sober analysis of the evidence might well indicate that the most intense period of actual manufacturing industrialization in the Third World may be coming to an end in the near future. Insofar as this is the case, the recent spate of publications forecasting a new manufacturing panacea for Latin America may be more of an ideological device to keep alive technocratic and nationalistic hopes for development than a realistic assessment of possibilities.

As long as the United States (and other countries) exercise domination over Latin America, industrial development will continue to be *development within a sphere of influence,* **i.e.,** development and growth primarily for the benefit of the U.S. economy. In the present circumstances such development seems to imply more assemblage, more control, and more polluting industry.

NOTES

1. A few examples are: Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1973); J. N. Bhagwati, *The New International Economic Order* (1977); Jan Tinbergen, *Reshaping the International Order* (1976); G. K. Helleiner, "Multinational Corporations, Manufactures Exports and Employment in Less Developed Countries," ILO: Tripartite World Conference on Employment, Income Distribution and Social Progress and the International Division of Labour—Background Papers, vol. 2 (Geneva: ILO, June 1976).
2. See, for instance, Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review* (September-October, 1973).
3. The notion of development through the export of manufactures is part of the official development plans of Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, among others.
4. These ideas are taken as self-evident truths by Ajit Singh, "De-Industrialization in Advanced Countries, Industrialization of the Third World, and the Structure of the World Economy," (Mexico, D. F.: Colegio de México) August 1979 (mimeo). For a cogent presentation of a different view, cf. Clive Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

5. Singh, *op. cit.*
6. The data have been culled from the following sources: G. K. Helleiner, "Manufactured Exports from Less Developed Countries and Multinational Firms," *The Economic Journal* (March 1973); D. Keesing, "Recent Trends in Manufactured and Total Exports from Developing Countries," June 1977 (mimeo); Guillermo Perry, "El nuevo orden comercial internacional," *Coyuntura Económica* (Bogotá, Colombia: FEDESARROLLO, 1977).
7. See Javier Villanueva, "La industrialización latinoamericana y las nuevas condiciones de la economía internacional," (Santiago, Chile: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, Documento de Trabajo No. 145, 1978).
8. Guillermo Perry, "Los mercados mundiales de manufacturas y la industrialización de los paises en desarrollo," (Santiago, Chile: Corporación de Promoción Universitaria, Documento de Trabajo No. 141, 1978).
9. See Donald Keesing, "World Trade and Output of Manufactures: Structural Trends and Developing Countries' Exports," World Bank, (1978, mimeo). See also, Raúl Trajtenberg, "Transnacionales y fuerza de trabajo en la periferia" (Mexico: Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales, 1978).
10. See Fernando Fajinzylber and T. Martinez Tragó, *Las empresas transnacionales* (Mexicó: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976).
11. For an excellent analysis of the *sectoral* character of much of the actual "redeployment" taking place, see Isaac Minian, "Rivalidad intercapitalista e industrialización en el subdesarrollo," *Economía de América Latina* (Mexico: CIDE, 1979), no. 2.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Newsweek* (October 29, 1979), p. 36.
14. "A Strategy to Develop Capital Goods in Mexico," (Mexico: NAFINSA-UNIDO, 1977).
15. For a critique, see Kurt Unger, "The Strategy to Develop Capital Goods in Mexico: An Assessment," (Mexico: CIDE, 1979) (mimeo).

The task of the intellectual is not to decide where there are battles but to join them wherever and whenever the people wage them. Commitment is an act, not a word.

—Jean-Paul Sartre

It is very hard to say what has been the greater evil as far as the economic development of underdeveloped countries is concerned: the removal of their economic surplus by foreign capital or its reinvestment by foreign enterprise.

—Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth*, p. 184

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CRITICIZING ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

BY BRUCE ANDREWS

This article appeared in *Inside Fordham* (November 1979), a publication designed primarily for Fordham University alumni. It deals specifically with the California-based Campaign for Economic Democracy which originated in Tom Hayden's 1976 bid for the Democratic Party's senatorial nomination in California. The issues involved, however—especially the contrast between the CED's anti-corporate analysis and its rejection of a socialist solution—are much more general and deserve to be thoroughly analyzed and discussed by all elements of the left in the United States. Bruce Andrews is a member of the Fordham Department of Political Science.—The Editors

"The Vietnam War Is Not a Mistake! Bring the War in Vietnam Home!" These two clarion calls of the 1960s are on my mind, as I sit among 2,000 to 3,000 students. Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda are barnstorming this fall with their Campaign for Economic Democracy (CED). Today it's at Fordham College amidst a lot of hoopla, controversy, and stirrings of the mixture that was so explosive ten years ago: student idealism and discontent (though this time the mixture is tempered with what some call "maturity" and others call self-centered passivity and cynicism).

"The next great reform on history's agenda is the achievement of Economic Democracy." The economy is governed by concentrated corporate power; our democratic political system is supposedly governed by popular will. The two principles are not compatible—one principle will gradually absorb the other (or has it already?). It's corporate freedom *versus* democracy. Now, the two phrases about Vietnam seem relevant here. First,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam was not a mistake. No, then and now, America's problems are systemic—problems generated by a structure of power. Wars like Vietnam (or the development of nuclear power) are not mistakes, but are conscious policies, and typical consequences of a late capitalist system. A tight alliance between government and business exists. We don't just see corporate pressures on government; there's also a *structural delimiting* of the way the public interest is defined. Corporate priorities set the agenda of policy. And also: *bring the war home.* Didn't this imply, stop avoiding these structural problems by focusing obsessively on foreign adventures (the great escape, the frontier)? Don't let the energies needed for social transformation at home be siphoned off abroad. Don't let patriotism or knee-jerk anti-communism be used as an excuse for the status quo or as an anesthetic. Awake from this terrible sleep.

Certain Fordham students would have none of it. They were bringing the war home another way—seemingly more intent on rewriting the history of the Vietnam war (to justify their patriotism? their insecurity?) than on hearing about *our* domestic troubles. The speakers were heckled and booed (visibly by young whites, wearing their uniforms of either military or athletic masculinity). A big "Go Home, Hanoi Jane" sign in evidence—and typically played up by the media. A barrage of questions about torture of U.S. POWs and the current policies of Vietnam—a continuing obsession. *Even at home,* the wounds of the war have not healed. Fonda finally had to interrupt a succession of anti-anti-war questions with "Don't you care about America? Let's concentrate on our own problems."

At the end, many more-sympathetic students said it was all impractical—or asked, plaintively, What can we do?, complaining that Hayden and Fonda had given them no practical routes for political practice. These students had perhaps accepted the boundaries of the system under attack, so that "impractical" meant impossible, the way things worked now. The boundaries Hayden and Fonda were trying to alter had become taken-for-granted, accepted as fate, as natural phenomena. This is reification; it is also how mythology works. It helps our students look ahead to their individually styled careers, strutting with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superiority in the face of such structural criticism. They can call it mere idealism, rhetoric, pie-in-the-sky, "not relevant."

Such students are "going with the flow." Today, conservative criticism of the very idea of structural change is fashionable. So is criticism of the liberal strategies and welfare-state measures derived from the New Deal. The political coalition which supported those strategies, as well as the Democratic Party which represents that coalition, is on the defensive. The recent period is characterized by a resurgence of corporate power and intolerance. The "principles" of corporate freedom are undermining the success of democracy. We see an active campaign by business (and conservative intellectuals) to demobilize an active public, to weaken any faith in the conscious political direction of society, and to roll back the hard-won gains of (in particular) the 1960s—for example, to value privatized, self-seeking behavior over community control or political mobilization; to reduce the power of the working class, the poor, minorities, and women; to end the reluctance of the educated public to tolerate a costly interventionist foreign policy; and, business's greatest coup, to lay the blame for inflation at the door of government spending (thus immunizing oligopoly capitalism).

A campaign for economic democracy provides sharp contrast—calling as it does for a program of renewable energy, control over inflation, and regulation of the corporate world. Hayden and Fonda's analysis was structural. It centered on the task of freeing Americans from the exploitation of giant corporations. *Energy* and *public impotence* were keynotes. Nuclear power is at the target's center—a typical example of unbridled corporate power and profit-seeking at odds with the public interest and threatening an "Age of Total Catastrophe." It illustrates the larger problems: the government defends the priorities of big business almost like a reflex; it is impotent when it comes to directing a social system which is privately owned. At the heart of all the nostalgic references to competitive enterprise—the dictates of the market, the reality of individual freedom, and other blinding myths—is the fact that private ownership has become concentrated corporate power beyond the capacity of public or politicians to control. By determining prices, employment, and the flow of capital, it dwarfs even Presidential power (that tar-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nished liberal dream). It was indicted on these counts: centralized power, income inequality, loss of jobs, discrimination, pollution, cancer and other health hazards, product safety, consumer manipulation, decline of community, and inflation.

To combat this condition, a mass movement is needed—dedicated to gaining the power over the economic decision-process that we claim over the political one: hence, the pleasing tag, "Economic Democracy" (which they capitalize). It is designed to carry us into the "Age of Renewable Resources," to return a sense of purpose to public participation, and to give a shared vision and meaning to personal life. This is good old-fashioned anti-corporate sentiment and populist analysis. As one student said: "Sure, economic democracy sounds good—we all hate the corporations; but at the same time we're told to go out and get good jobs in them."

The fatal flaw is not so obvious, and it may just be a predictable feature of political rhetoric (and here, the notion of many on the left that Hayden is on a self-aggrandizing ego trip or is playing stalking horse for Jerry Brown might account for their pulling punches, right and left). The flaw I'm talking about is *the gap between the explanation and the prescription.* Point blank, if the CED's analysis makes sense, their proposed remedies are hopelessly (helplessly) inadequate; and therefore, from the standpoint of education, misleading. As a coalition-building strategy for radical activists trying to build a majoritarian movement under the comforting banner of democracy, this gap between theory and practice might be a blessing. But for someone actually trying to grasp the structured complexity of the system we live under, and to draw from the analysis a clear idea about the changes that would be needed to transform it, the program of the Campaign for Economic Democracy is a tease.

On energy, they would promote alternative sources and conservation technologies, price controls, and divestiture. Yet the present condition may express a more basic (and intransigent) logic. Nuclear power, for instance, was developed because it fit, structurally, with the overall system that has come to depend on it; it promised profits, expansion, centralization, and a way of reducing competition. The growth of multinational

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corporate activity abroad (which they talk about restricting) makes sense in the same way. The *fundamental* qualities of both seem to call for more fundamental solutions than CED's ideas about price regulation or increasing participation by workers and consumers. Without a change of systems, wouldn't the broad horizons of decision be *roughly* the same? Would consumers or workers demand policies that cut dangerously against the grain of the system's principles? Wouldn't they become persuaded, as politicians have been, that these would lead to recession, inflation, and speedier economic decline?

When it comes to government, "accountability" becomes their criterion for change. As if the government's main problems lay in the *process* of policy-making and not in the limits which are placed on the *content* of policy by the need to reproduce the essential features of the status quo (such as corporate freedom). Opening government up to middle-class reformers may be mere cosmetic capitulation. After all, in the absence of a new logic, wouldn't the "people" be just as dependent on the success of the system as the government is today? Isn't that dependence the Achilles heel of liberalism? "Accountability" as a panacea ignores this. Fetishizing process may help us forget the limits of the system itself. Personalizing things runs the same risks —like the CED's vague talk about the role of "rugged individualism," of how "we can be brave" and "thrust toward a larger victory" (quoting Vince Lombardi!). "One can be a pioneer—by bringing the new energy age into one's life." As if solar energy or "taking the people into consideration" would erase the uncomfortable fact that our society is divided into classes and that class interests conflict. Taking collective control over more and more areas of your social life means more than being taken into consideration.

The situation they draw attention to is not some separable sideshow: it seems intrinsic to a system of private ownership and control over investment and production. If they're serious in their analysis, some way of placing investments completely under social control would be required—to direct them away from the maximizing of private profits. For example, it's misleadingly superficial to talk like Hayden about the oil companies: "We want them to be in business to make a profit; O.K., but their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primary function is to deliver gas and oil at prices we can afford." False. Profit and expansion is their primary function—and if that function is harder and harder to carry out, even reform politicians may cave in. Unless someone is willing to contemplate more drastic changes, they can be blackmailed by corporate warnings of "capital shortage," "stagnation," and the loss of "our competitive position" abroad. The result of this may be a new New Deal: a reformed private economy with a modernizing style of administration, this time requiring certain prerogatives of certain firms to be curtailed (for instance, the energy industry) so that the *national* interest of capitalism can be satisfied. This looks like an attack on big business, as the New Deal of the 1930s did, and it helps channel anti-business sentiment into less dangerous paths. In the end, it can bring about a systemic "tune-up" with a few particularist interests forced to curb their predatory instincts. With the current fiscal crisis, however, only the harsh curtailment of the government's social spending seems persuasive as a "solution" *within the system's limits*. And this can take place under the counter-cultureish "small-is-beautiful" auspices of a post-1960s white middle class as well as under the more militarized dictates of the (current) older patriarchs.

O.K., but they might create a mass movement. Maybe any popular outburst demanding control over social life is to be welcomed—even if it's pragmatic and narrowly issue-oriented. The implications of what looks like a new political culture may be far-reaching enough to necessitate more dramatic change later. Nevertheless, misleading analysis breeds false hopes. Beyond electing a few progressives and speeding the demise of nuclear power, does the mass movement have any place to go? After all, throughout U.S. history waves of popular mobilization tend to be "solved" with newer forms of what we could call prophylactic institutionalization. As Hayden admits: "If the Establishment reluctantly accepts the basic minimum demands of the movement, it will mean a setback for certain privileged groups, but the general status quo is maintained. The movement subsides with the coming of victory, the moderate wing of leadership is brought into the system and the more radical leadership is isolated, discredited, or destroyed."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A clearer-headed movement might be smaller, but it wouldn't burn its members out or be absorbed so easily if its prescriptions fit its analysis. The maintenance of "the general status quo" may well be the source of the discontent: discontent which allows the movement's leaders to enter the system and then defend its institutions. And if the problem is the *principles* by which a privately-owned economy operates, then wouldn't those principles have to be changed? Capitalism itself and the corporate control over society would have to be transcended; a true economic democracy would be a radically democratic form of socialism. A real across-the-board democratization would require such an economic system. Otherwise, faced with the trade-off between public control over politics and corporate control over the economy, the former will give way to protect the latter.

For logic's sake, the CED's rejection of "socialism" makes little sense. What can it mean? They talk as if socialism meant "equality" and as if this required a giant bureaucratic albatross around our necks (both notions designed to put off the middle class). Either they think a slightly different form of capitalism will not keep generating the same problems they've built their campaign around (in which case their efforts are relatively trivial), or they don't understand that the real implications of the needed reforms are incompatible with the nature of capitalism itself (in which case their analysis is naive). Maybe they understand this, but are simply trying to test the limits and mobilize discontent. But then, how to explain their embrace of that perennially complacent view that criticizes bureaucracy and politicians and thinks the system can solve problems intrinsic to its nature? Their disavowal of socialism helps reinforce the conservative cliché that since state socialisms abroad are unresponsive to popular action, an American version could be no different. You would expect socialism to be the logical prescription, given their own analysis of the inherently undemocratic nature of a capitalist economy. Is the medicine too frightening? Is an overall vision being reduced to the few components that can be easily marketed? As Freud once said, "I like to avoid concessions to faint heartedness. One gives way first in words, and then little by little in substance too."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

books on education from **Monthly Review Press**

ON EDUCATION

Articles on Educational Theory and Pedagogy,
and Writings for Children from **The Age of Gold**

José Martí

edited, with an introduction and notes, by

Philip S. Foner

selected by CHOICE as an OUTSTANDING ACADEMIC BOOK for 1980

"Martí wrote extensively on education and related themes, and this selection includes a wide range of articles. . . . For students of education at all levels, this book has a special importance; and Martí has an uncanny relevance to contemporary concerns. . . ."
—CHOICE

Cloth: CL4833/$14.00/£7·50

STUDIES IN SOCIALIST PEDAGOGY

edited by

Theodore Mills Norton and Bertell Ollman

"In effect, this is a methods book dealing with the organization and presentation of socialist ideas in the university classroom. . . . As an educationalist, I found it to be a knowledgeable attempt to provide insight into university teaching. Most university instructors disdain discussing the how of teaching and dwell on the content of instruction. In this work, the writers have divorced their thinking somewhat from content and have dealt with the planning, organization of content and the methods of instruction. There are some interesting observations provided from a pedagogical perspective. University instruction, as a part of pedagogy, rates careful examination and analysis as well as any other level of teaching."—THE SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL. "Norton and Ollman have performed an important task for socialist educators. Socialists ought to read this book and think about its contents. . . ."—IN THESE TIMES

Includes essays by: V. I. Lenin, Mao Zedong, Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire, Leo Huberman, John McDermott, Ira Shor, Michael Meeropol.

Paperback: PB5007/$6.50/£3·55 Cloth: CL440X/$16.50/£9·75

add 75¢ for the first book, 25¢ for each additional book when ordering by mail

62 West 14th St., New York, N.Y. 10011 / 47 Red Lion St., London WC1R 4PF

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

A SYNTHESIS OF DEPENDENCY AND CLASS ANALYSIS

By Andrew Zimbalist

Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World by James Petras. Monthly Review Press, 1979; 384 pages, $15.

This is a rich and wide-ranging collection of essays. Petras is among the most rigorous, innovative, and provocative Marxist scholars in the United States, and he is one of the few left academics in this country who is greatly respected in universities and left-wing political circles throughout Latin America. The reason for this is not obscure. Petras knows Latin America profoundly, and his studies are always informed, both in his choice of subjects and mode of analysis, by an underlying concern for political change.

Although economic-development literature is chiefly distinguished by its absence of integrative theory, there has been a modest progression over the years toward more satisfying conceptualizations of the development process: from ad hoc, piecemeal, ahistorical formulation to the import-substitution *desarrollista* school, to dependency models, and finally to class-infused neo-dependency theories. With each step along this progression, the theoretical framework has become more systematic and more capable of explaining structural limitations to successful long-term capital accumulation in the periphery. The *desarrollista* approach embraced

---

Andrew Zimbalist is the editor of *Case Studies on the Labor Process* (Monthly Review Press, November 1979) and co-author of *Economic Democracy: Workers' Participation in Chilean Industry, 1970-1973* (New York: Academic Press, 1978). He teaches economics at Smith College.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and projected a development policy which, albeit moderately successful for a specific and brief historical period, had by the time of its advocacy become ineffectual (except insofar as it promoted increasing penetration by multinational corporations and shifted the levers of subordination). The dependency approach of Andre Gunder Frank, Theotonio Dos Santos, and others focused directly upon imperial capital as the chief problematic in the study of underdevelopment, providing important and lasting insights. However, dependency theory treated underdeveloped countries largely as putty, uniformly molded and deformed at will by foreign capital. Fernando Cardoso and Enrique Faletto in their *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (1969) improved upon the early dependency approach by introducing the role of the state, material conditions, and class formation. However, their treatment was overly schematic and their consideration of class forces too perfunctory and narrow.

In this book, Petras has raised the analysis to a new plane: "What I propose in these essays is an effort at synthesis of dependency and class analysis. . . . Insofar as imperialist forces act, they operate within the class formation and cannot be conceptualized as the impersonal forces of the market, but rather they must be marked as part of the internal class alignments." (pp. 10, 37) The first three pieces provide a compelling theoretical elaboration of this position. Petras gives full play to heterogeneous class structures and their interaction with the local and imperial states as well as with foreign capital and accumulation conditions in the international market. What emerges is a dynamic typology of development forces and strategies, convincingly exemplified with reference to historical experience in a broad selection of countries. If there is a weakness in this presentation, it lies in insufficient discussion of the role of technology and material-resource bases in the development process (see, for instance, Clive Thomas, *Dependence and Transformation,* Monthly Review Press, 1974).

The remaining nine essays are analytical applications of the theoretical approach outlined in the beginning chapters. In the limited space below I will briefly consider a selection of these essays. "Industrialization in the Third World" is an extensive rebuttal of Bill Warren's article "Myths of Underdevelopment." (*New Left Review,* no. 81) Warren's essay, which has been cited widely in the development literature, argues that the international forces of development have changed and that, contrary to the assertions of neo-Marxists and dependency theorists, capitalist industrialization in the Third World can take and is taking place. Petras'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

argument (the piece is co-authored by Philip McMichael and Robert Rhodes) proceeds at two levels—theoretical and empirical. On the one hand, according to Petras, Warren has misrepresented the theory he criticizes and has erroneously equated a short-run spurt in industrial growth in selected countries with successful long-term development. On the other, he has misused and misinterpreted his data. This debate between Warren and Petras addresses head-on what seems to me to be the basic issue—the capacity for and character of capitalist development in the Third World—and, as such, is excellent material for classroom use or study groups.

The fifth essay, "The Latin American Agro-Transformation From Above and Outside," argues that large-scale agro-enterprises are coming to dominate rural production relations in the Third World. Consequently, the terms of effective structural reform have changed. The traditional, economically wasteful *latifundio* is no longer the central problem. Besides, past efforts at breaking up the *fundo* and redistributing the land have been unsuccessful because of "(1) the excess of landed population that is not incorporated into reform units . . ." and because (2) "the reform beneficiaries depend upon the manufacturers of farm inputs, processors, and commercial exporters that can extract the surplus without the risks of weather or the problems of labor or politics at the point of production." (p. 139) Petras puts a different land-reform program on the agenda:

> The new large-scale expansive units have increasingly socialized production while remaining in private hands. The problem today is not to redistribute land but to socialize the agro-industrial sector. To redivide the land is to revert to an earlier form of organization of production, which undermines the development of productive forces. . . . (p. 139)

"The Rise and Fall of Regional Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1969-1977" (with Morris Morley) is a history of the Andean Pact—its effort to form a common market and assert stringent controls over foreign capital, thereby promoting indigenous capital accumulation in the Andean region. The Pact, they argue, was never stronger than the political positions and unity of the signatory nations. Exemptions weakened the Pact from the beginning, and regressive political developments in the region have led to the Pact's effective demise. They conclude: "Rather than serve as a defensive weapon to strengthen and concentrate local capital, the regionalist project will now be part of the division of labor elaborated within the metropole." (p. 177)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The last four essays deal respectively with the failure of the Popular Unity government in Chile, the contradictions of the quasi-nationalist development model of the Carlos Andrés Pérez government in Venezuela, the colonial roots of the Puerto Rican economic crisis, and finally a theory of twentieth-century socialist revolutions. Petras' evaluation of the Allende period in Chile is one of the best I've read. He rejects the two pat "left" critiques of the Popular Unity government:

> Thus, for assorted Maoists and Trotskyists, the Chilean working class was a revolutionary force throughout the 1970-1973 period, striving for socialism but led by "traitorous" bureaucratic reformist leaders who misled and misdirected it from its "natural course." On the other hand, communist and social democratic accounts describe the workers as essentially "economistic" and capable of developing socialist consciousness only after a prolonged period of socialist education and gradual economic change under the party's tutelage. (p. 218)

Petras offers a more complex and persuasive interpretation and demonstrates how U.S. policy interacted with domestic class forces and alignments to produce the final overthrow of the government. My only objection is that Petras underestimates (p. 223) the extent of transformation achieved in social relations at the enterprise level and the key role this transformation played in the advance of worker consciousness during the period.

The final essay, "Toward a Theory of Twentieth-Century Socialist Revolutions," is interesting and even ingenious at points; yet it seems to me to be a bit overdrawn. The thesis can be divided into two parts. First: "Socialist revolutions are not the product of backwardness; rather, revolutionary movements have developed with the spread of capitalism and in opposition to the exploitative relations it engenders." (p. 299) Second: "In twentieth-century socialist revolutions the original impetus, organization, leadership, and ideology of the revolutionary struggle *began* precisely in the more advanced sectors of the peripheral economy: in Russia, the Petrograd proletariat led by the Bolshevik Party; in China and in Vietnam, in the coastal cities; in Cuba, in Havana." (p. 275) As I see it, the problem lies with his second point. Although the role of the urban working class in Chinese and Cuban revolutionary struggles cannot be denied, neither can the role of peasant and rural working-class struggles, organization, and ideology be gainsaid. Ultimately, the revolutionary ideology in China and Cuba reflected the experiences of both groups. In singling out the urban working class,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Petras has oversimplified his analysis of the character of revolutionary struggle as well as the contradictory forces of socialist development in each country.

Petras' insistence on locating the roots of the true collectivist, revolutionary organization and ideology in urban working-class struggles leads him furthest astray in his interpretation of the Chinese Revolution. Here he seems to offer a dressed-up Trotskyist hypothesis: the Chinese revolution had a solid urban working-class base until its betrayal by Stalin and the Communist Party defeat in Shanghai in 1927; thereafter, the revolutionary movement begins to incorporate non-working class elements and, as a consequence, party organization becomes bureaucratic and ideology becomes populist. In this formulation Mao and his faction are not perceived as authentic socialist leaders but as peasant-populist elements which promote non-democratic centralism, decentralization, and populism all at the same time. Petras further muddles his discussion of class alliances during the Chinese revolutionary struggle by suggesting a major role for "rural proletarians." Whereas such a phrase would be immediately understandable in the context of the Cuban revolutionary struggle, it is unclear to whom Petras refers in the Chinese countryside where laborers, in the first half of this century, were predominantly tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and small landholders. The evidence I have seen suggests that these groups figured more significantly in the struggle against the Kuomintang and Japanese than did the small numbers of rural wage laborers. Petras' main sources for his China discussion (Harold Isaacs, Jean Chesneaux, and Livio Maitan) are not well-known for providing a non-sectarian historiography of the period.

Notwithstanding these differences I have with Petras' last essay, the pieces of this collection stand as a compelling and coherent whole. They offer a fresh theoretical approach to studying the development process which goes beyond earlier Marxist works. This approach is consistently applied throughout in a series of thoughtful case studies. I believe the book will provide scholars with provocative insights for their own research as well as abundant material for lively and centrally focused debate in their classes.

Have you joined the Associates?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVIEW

a journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations

Editor: Immanuel Wallerstein

Review is committed to the pursuit of a perspective which recognizes the primacy of analysis of economies over long historical time and large space, the holism of the socio-historical process, and the transitory (heuristic) nature of theories.

The contents of Volume III (1979-80) include:

Rodney Hilton	"Towns in English Feudal Society"
Georges Haupt	"In What Sense and to What Degree was the Russian Revolution a Proletarian Revolution?"
Ramkrishna Mukherjee	"On the Appraisal of Social Reality and Thus on the Quality of Life"
Pierre Vilar	"Spain and Catalonia"
A special issue on	"The Incorporation of Southern Africa into the World-Economy, 1800-1940"
Debates on	"Serfdom and Capitalism in East Elbia" "The Scottish Example"

Previous Volumes contain articles by Anouar Abdel-Malek, Giovanni Arrighi, Norman Birnbaum, Fernand Braudel, Arghiri Emmanuel, M.I. Finley, André Gunder Frank, Ernest Gellner, Georges Haupt, Rodney Hilton, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Halil Inalcik, Ernest Labrousse, Frederic Lane, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Bernard Magubane, Sidney Mintz, Henri H. Stahl, Charles Tilly

Institutions $30.00 Individuals $15.00 (yearly rates)

SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC.
275 South Beverly Drive
Beverly Hills, California 90212

SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
28 Banner Street
London EC1Y 8QE, England

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WOMEN AND THE HEGEMONY OF THE EXPERTS

By Christine Stansell

For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women by Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English. Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978, 324 pp., $10; paperback, 1979, 384 pages, $3.95.

Since the nineteenth century, American women have shown a singular deference to those specialists in medicine, social work, and psychiatry who pronounce upon "female" and family problems. In 1955, in fact, Benjamin Spock, the most successful counselor of them all, could identify women's willingness to take advice from professionals as one of the innate differences between the sexes. *For Her Own Good* shows how this subordination came to be: it details the rise of a class of "experts" who have made their names and fortunes from advising women on a wide range of difficulties, from gynecological disorders to children who can't read. The central argument of the book is that, more often than not, these women's problems were manufactured by the very experts who proposed to solve them.

The questions the authors confront are ones which demand both Marxist and feminist perspectives. Why, despite the proliferation of domestic labor-saving devices, has the average time American women spend on housework increased rather than decreased

Christine Stansell teaches women's history and American social history at Bard College. She is writing a book on poor women in nineteenth-century New York City.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

since 1920?* Why does domestic work continue to be so psychologically charged for even the most progressive-minded women, and why are the appearance of their homes and the behavior of their children matters in which women's sense of their own value is so much more deeply entangled than that of men? Ehrenreich and English admirably succeed in constructing a socialist-feminist explanation. The answers, they argue, lie with the hegemony of the experts, who have consistently linked the standards of domestic life they dictate to women's worth as human beings. In the name of the corporate values of expertise and rationalization, the experts set themselves up as the best judges of what was wrong—and right—in the American home; in so doing they perpetrated an ideology of domination which by the 1950s penetrated all classes of American women.

The inherent problem of the experts with their female audience has always been the necessity to prove the existence of a need for their services: a need which did not necessarily exist before they entered the scene. In the paradigmatic case of nineteenth-century medicine, Ehrenreich and English show how the experts did this by creating and monopolizing the practice of "scientific" medicine. American physicians of the early nineteenth century were in a highly competitive enterprise, and among their most successful rivals were midwives and lay healers. In order to legitimate themselves as a profession, with the status and high fees which professionalism implies, male physicians had to usurp the control of medicine and midwifery, both traditional women's skills, from the hands of these far more accessible and less expensive "amateurs." Well into the late nineteenth century, male physicians were not successful in their struggle. It was not until the turn of the century that they won the battle, as the mystique of "scientific" medicine, enshrined in t' e newly-founded laboratories of Johns Hopkins and the Rockefell : Institute, effectively discredited the lay healers.

The emergence of professional medical science was, in turn, connected to the changing character of housework under monopoly capitalism. The germ theory of disease, developed in the new medical laboratories, was widely discussed in women's magazines at the turn of the century; it became a vehicle for middle-class fears of "contamination" from the millions of immigrants streaming into

* See chart in *America's Working Women*, Rosalyn Baxandall, Linda Gordon, Susan Reverby, eds. (New York: Vintage Books, 1976), Appendix I. Their source is: Joann Vanek, "Time Spent in Housework," *Scientific American* (November 1974), p. 118.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the country in these years. Any public place or object was suspect: articles with titles such as "Books Spread Contagion," "Infection and Postage Stamps," and "Disease from Public Laundries," were common fare for housewives. This was the era when Sinclair Lewis's *The Jungle,* a searing exposé of working conditions in the Chicago meat-packing plants, occasioned the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act rather than occupational health legislation. City-dwellers and employers of servants felt themselves to be particularly vulnerable to the working-class menace: the famed "Typhoid Mary," an Irish cook in New York, left behind a trail of fifty-two typhoid cases in the homes of her employers. In the face of this threat, the middle-class housewife became an ally of public health, as the American Medical Association advised in 1899: doctors who knew the value of a trained nurse could "readily appreciate the value of a training which will . . . establish a sanitary regime in every room in the home as well as in the kitchen and dining room."

In these discussions of housework, *For Her Own Good* is at its best. We see how the displacement of class and sex anxieties, engineered and capitalized upon by the experts, has shaped the smallest details of women's lives: dusting, for example. The home-economics movement, founded at the turn of the century by a woman chemist who was excluded from her field, made the duster a crucial weapon in the war for a hygienic home. Not only dusting, but *dusting in a particular way*—"expert" dusting—became a woman's social responsibility: one home economist ominously described an experiment in which "3000 living organisms" grew on one pinpoint of dust. "The dry duster had never reached them," she stressed. "A damp one alone could render them harmless."

The influence of the home economists was not limited to the middle class. In urban schools, night classes, and settlement houses, home-economics teachers linked "domestic science" to the gospel of Americanization. Immigrant mothers and daughters heard that such techniques as damp dusting and such amenities as individual hand towels could be the key to success in America. There was the obverse side to this coin, of course: the message that those who held on to the old ways of housekeeping, predicated on habits of sharing scarce domestic goods like silverware and linen, or who found it impossible to keep their one-room tenements hygienically clean, were *themselves* responsible for their families' poverty and ill health. "What came across was this idea that your home environment was no good and *you* had to make it different," recalled a Russian Jewish woman who grew up in the Bronx. "For example, we learned that the only right way to cook was to make everything

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

separately. . . . The string beans weren't supposed to touch the mashed potatoes and so forth." She constantly criticized her immigrant mother for not meeting the standards of the home-economics teacher. "Now that I think back, that's more or less what my mother and I fought about all the time. We were fighting about life in the home."

The redefinition of motherhood as a science accompanied this idea of housework as a profession requiring technical preparation and study. With the rise of child study as a special field of psychology in the 1920s, the experts began to stress behavioral technique, raising baby "by the book," rather than the "natural" maternal instinct favored by the Victorians. "Have you heard about Gesell's studies at Yale?" a Vassar graduate of 1933 asks a friend in Mary McCarthy's *The Group*. "Finally we're going to have a scientific picture of the child." But on this matter, as in most others, the experts over time would consistently contradict themselves. Scientific child-rearing would in turn give way to an ethos of permissiveness, which culminated in the 1950s in what the authors term "libidinal motherhood": the ideal, formulated most explicitly in the psychiatric advice of that era, of the woman who found her own deepest fulfillment in pregnancy, nursing, and caring for small children. Women who worked, of course, denied these deepest libidinal instincts. In our own time, the tide has again turned. In the wake of the experience of the late 1960s, perceived by psychiatric "experts" like Bruno Bettelheim as a "crack-up" of the "Spock-marked generation," a new authoritarianism has won the day: such titles as *Power to the Parents* and *Dare to Discipline* crowd Dr. Spock off the shelf. Thus the experts have gone on reversing themselves. Should you make a child eat his vegetables or let him choose his food for himself? Should children nurse until they wean themselves? Choose their own bedtimes or go to bed on schedule? Beneath the array of answers from those who claim to know, there has only been one constant: the systematic effort to deny that women themselves, rather than male professionals, might be the best judges of how to raise their children.

In sum, this book maps out the terrain on which our formative experiences of human relationships take place. Readers of all ages will recognize ghosts of their own family lives, faint memories which Ehrenreich and English have pulled from the shadows of all our individual psychodramas. "Stages," for instance, an explanation of children's behavior which many parents and children of the 1950s may remember: the child "going through a stage" was a formula of Gesell's scientific theory of child development.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Here, too, are more general clarifications of the profound tensions of family life throughout that especially dreary decade: the double bind of mothers, asked to submerge their identities and ambitions in their children and at the same time to circumvent the sin of over-protective "mom-ism"; the strains on fathers, directed to be both strong "masculine" authorities in their families and "pals" to their children; the pressures on children, forced into over-involved family lives. Finally, without lapsing into the bankrupt vagaries of psychohistory, here is an explanation of the bitterness with which so many middle-class parents viewed the political rebellions of their children in the 1960s, an illumination of their sense of betrayal, of their own sacrifices to permissiveness gone bad.

For Her Own Good is a work of popular rather than scholarly history, and it has both the virtues and weaknesses of that genre. Real historical connections are often missing; most seriously, the "rise of the experts" becomes a hypostatized force which sweeps people in its wake. The reader is not sure, in the end, exactly *why* women have bought the experts' advice: there is a sense in which women emerge in the book as dupes rather than as active agents in making their own history. There is also a tendency to glibness in the writing, a wisecracking commentary which has the effect of making the experts out to be self-serving hypocrites whom the authors then unmask. Sarcasm, in the end, is not conducive to good radical history, whatever its justifications may be. History is a serious business, and we can construct much better Marxist explanations of its workings by assuming that even the agents of social oppression have been in dead earnest.

Criticisms aside, however, Ehrenreich and English have written a non-academic history which has the great virtues of being perceptive, well-researched, imaginative, and accessible to a broad audience. It is a valuable book for those who have little acquaintance with the concerns of socialist-feminism and would like to know more; and it is also good reading for students. For Marxists and feminists alike, the authors have taken a step toward showing exactly how the work of women reproduces class and sex domination, how the dictates of capitalism have penetrated into the heart of our everyday experience—the work of the household which we are all too ready to consider private, a refuge or "haven" from the world of the marketplace.

In left political circles the character of housework has been a subject of considerable theoretical discussion, centering, particularly in England, on whether housework produces surplus value and thus can be considered a sphere of exploitation equal to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factory. It is the contribution of Ehrenreich and English to take us out of this academic debate to a specific analysis of the labor process itself, thereby broadening the ground that Harry Braverman broke with *Labor and Monopoly Capital.* We now have more ways to understand how the domestic work of women, as well as that of factory and office workers, damages and deforms our capacities. This is a matter of personal importance for any woman who has felt the irresistible compulsion to do some enervating piece of housework, late at night, against all human reason: it is a matter of political importance for all who believe that socialism cannot emerge simply from a transfer of ownership, but must involve changes in the most basic processes of everyday life. As the authors conclude: "The Woman Question becomes the question of how shall we all—women and children and men—organize our lives together. This is a question which has no answer in the marketplace or among the throng of experts who sell their wisdom there. And this is the *only* question."

soon to be in paperback from **Monthly Review Press**

The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays

E. P. THOMPSON

"A long overdue critique of the reductionist, determinist and authoritarian elements in Marxism, this is Thompson at his best, and essential reading for American radicals."—THE NATION.

"Of all the corruptions that came with Stalinism, that repression of honest criticism in the name of a necessary solidarity was one of the worst. It is one of the merits of this cantankerous, opinionated, truth-seeking book that it argues the necessity of criticism precisely in the name of that solidarity. Those who can, which does not include everyone, should read 'The Poverty of Theory.' "—THE NEW REPUBLIC

Cloth: CL4892/$16.00/£8·75 Paper: PB4914/$6.50/£3·55

add 75¢ when ordering by mail

62 West 14th St., New York, N.Y. 10011 / 47 Red Lion St., London WC1R 4PF

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KAPITALISTATE

P.O. Box 5138, BERKELEY, CA 94705

CURRENT ISSUE #8 (APRIL, 1980)

M. Brian Murphy and **Alan Wolfe**, *Democracy in Disarray*
Paul Johnston, *Democracy, Public Work and Labor Strategy*
Dudley Burton and **M. Brian Murphy**, *Planning, Austerity and the Democratic Prospect*
Zillah Eisenstein, *The State, the Patriarchal Family, and Working Mothers*
Ronald H. Chilcote, *Perspectives of Class and Political Struggle in the Portuguese Capitalist State*

Plus reviews of Ian Gough, Ellen Kay Trimberger, Claudia Von Braunmuhl, and Franco Cassano

	U.S./CANADA	FOREIGN
Subscription [4 issues]		
Individuals	$12.00	$14.00
Libraries and Institutions	24.00	28.00
Single Issues [Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7]		
Individuals	4.00	4.50
Libraries and Institutions	8.00	9.00

Name _____

Street _____

City, State, Postal Code _____

We Keep In Touch With Latin America
Keep In Touch With Us

SUBSCRIBE NOW!

LAWG LETTER

Published by the **Latin American Working Group**

A bi-monthly newsletter with critical up-to-date reporting on:
Canadian government and corporate involvement,
peoples' movements, news events, political analysis,
social, cultural and development issues
in Latin America from a Canadian perspective.

Individuals ..... $10.00 (for 8 issues)
Institutions 17.00
Government Agencies 30.00
Air Mail, add..... 5.00

Write for free catalogue

L.A.W.G. Box 2207, Station P Toronto, Ontario M5S 2T2

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now in paperback from **Monthly Review Press**

Death on the Job

Occupational Health and Safety Struggles
in the United States

Daniel M. Berman

"This book reveals a truth too long concealed: Charles Dickens is alive and well and living in the United States."—STUDS TERKEL

"Berman begins his powerful analysis with a terse history of the killing power of work since the industrial revolution, in order to clarify the origins of current compensation and safety plans (here deemed ineffective). . . . The report retains an even, unsensational tone throughout, ending with several feasible suggestions on improving the situation through union and individual activism."—**American Library Association BOOKLIST**

PB5279 $6.50/£3·55

add 75¢ when ordering by mail

62 West 14th St., New York, N.Y. 10011 / 47 Red Lion St., London WC1R 4PF

NACLA ON MEXICO

BEYOND THE BORDER
Mexico & the U.S. Today
by Peter Baird & Ed McCaughan
Paperback, illustrated and indexed, 204 pages, $5.95

From north to south move runaway shops, massive bank loans and counterinsurgency weapons. From south to north flow impoverished immigrants, natural resources, food and profits.

BEYOND THE BORDER traces the development of internal and international class relations from the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to the capitalist crisis of the 1970s. A 15-page appendix contains the most complete listing of foreign investments ever published.

BEYOND THE BORDER *shows the special importance of Mexican workers, why their struggles in Mexico and in this country will count heavily in our struggles, and why we should learn as much as we can about them before the inexorable crisis.*
John Womack, Jr., author, *Zapata*

☐ Please send me ___ copies of **BEYOND THE BORDER** at $5.95 each plus 75¢ postage.
☐ I would like a ___-year subscription to **NACLA Report on the Americas** for $13 a year.
Enclosed please find US $_____ total.
☐ I would like a copy of NACLA's Back Issues List.

Name_____
Address_____
_____ Zip _____

NACLA, 151 West 19th Street, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10011

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

EAST TIMOR: THE FINAL SOLUTION?

By Pat Flanagan

Timor is an island in the Malay Archipelago, some 360 miles northwest of Australia. Prior to the April 1974 military coup in Portugal, control of the island was divided between Indonesia and Portugal. Shortly after the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship, Indonesia sought to integrate the colony of East Timor, at first by trying to manipulate the political process of decolonization and, failing at that, by military invasion. The United Nations has on several occasions repudiated Indonesia's actions "inasmuch as the people of the Territory have not been able to exercise freely their right of self-determination and independence." The resistance to the Indonesian invasion is led by the *Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente* (FRETILIN), which declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28, 1975.

The following is the text of an address to the East Timor Independence Dinner held by the South Australian Campaign For an Independent East Timor at Adelaide University on December 1, 1979, to mark the fourth anniversary of the founding of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Pat Flanagan is a member of the Politics Department, University of Adelaide, Australia.

— THE EDITORS

Since their full-scale invasion of East Timor on December 7, 1975, the Indonesians have been engaged in a deliberate and systematic campaign of mass murder of the East Timorese population.

Doubtless the Indonesians would have preferred to achieve their aim of the "incorporation" of East Timor by less extreme methods. In addition to the repeated condemnations by civilized nations of the criminal invasion and ongoing atrocities, the Indonesian attempt to dominate and destroy the people of East Timor has been very costly in terms of men, money, and material.

But the genuine popular support for FRETILIN before, and even more so after, the December invasion left the Indonesians no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice. In a people's war, the enemy is indistinguishable from the people: the destruction of the one requires the destruction of the other. As French photo-journalist Denis Reichle reported after a brief visit (he was expelled) to East Timor in mid-1977, the Indonesians primarily didn't seek combat with FRETILIN forces. Instead, they were systematically wiping out the populations of villages known or suspected to be FRETILIN supporters and destroying FRETILIN supply lines and sources. FRETILIN forces, he reported, "are simply East Timorese who would rather die fighting than submit to what they consider to be Indonesian slavery." (*The Australian,* October 8, 1977) Anti-FRETILIN UDT refugees interviewed by Jim Dunn in Portugal in January 1977 testified that when the Indonesians captured Remexic and Aileu, all the Timorese in the villages except children under the age of three were shot, because "they were infected with the seeds of FRETILIN." (*Report on Talks with Timorese Refugees in Portugal,* Canberra, February 1977)

Indonesian Methods. In order to destroy the popular resistance to its annexation of East Timor, the Indonesians since the invasion have employed these methods as a matter of systematic policy:

- Direct military terror: the destruction of whole villages and the massacre of their inhabitants; naval and air (fighter-bomber and helicopter) bombardment, and in general, systematically indiscriminate mass killings.
- Systematic torture, rape, and looting.
- Crop destruction, scorched-earth policies, defoliation—in general, the destruction of the agricultural system as a means of starving the popular resistance into submission.
- Herding those starved into submission into urban concentration camps. According to the official Indonesian information recently reported by *Sydney Morning Herald* journalist Peter Rodgers, there are at least 150 of these camps, holding perhaps 300,000 people whose physical condition ranges from bad to critical.
- Finally, the already starving, malnourished, sick, and diseased concentration-camp inmates are subjected to deliberate medical and food deprivation.

Effects. The effects of these deliberate Indonesian methods are *first,* that the population of East Timor has been halved since the invasion, and *second,* that the remaining population is in imminent danger of death from starvation and medical deprivation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In one of his typically understated reports, in 1977, Jim Dunn could write:

It now seems beyond doubt that Indonesia's military operation to annex East Timor is one of the bloodiest episodes in per capita terms, in recent history. It is also clear that more than 90 percent of the casualties were in fact noncombatants, most of them women and children, who were indiscriminately killed either by soldiers or as a result of rocket attacks of bombing, including for a couple of months the use of napalm bombs. The use of napalm on highly inflammable palapa villages in the dry season could itself have resulted in a heavy loss of life. Disease and abnormally serious malnutrition, resulting from the upheavals of war would also probably have cost the lives of many Timorese, particularly the very young and the very old. One conclusion which emerges starkly from the information now available about recent events in Timor is that one of the most serious contraventions of human rights has been perpetrated in this small, remote territory, only 350 miles from Darwin. (*East Timor—From Portuguese Colonialism to Indonesian Incorporation,* Canberra, 1977)

This was published in September 1977, just before the Indonesians stepped up their mass-murder campaign in order to achieve the domination and destruction of the Timorese people—up to, and if necessary including, their Final Solution.

Today, after the effects of this all-out campaign, the Final Solution looms as an imminent probability—unless Indonesia can be stopped by the combined efforts of internal FRETILIN resistance and our external efforts, together with those of other opponents of genocide in the United States, Britain, France, and elsewhere.

I normally deliberately refrain from using the term "genocide" since it so readily lends itself to indiscriminate abuse (like "fascist" and "crisis") from people on all positions along the political spectrum. But there can be no question that, if the articles of the 1948 United Nations Geneva Convention defining "genocide" are applied, what we have in East Timor is precisely that. (For a detailed discussion and analysis in the case of Vietnam/Indochina, equally relevant to the East Timor situation, see *Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International War Crimes Tribunal,* 1968, edited by J. Duffett.)

Before this audience, it is unnecessary for me to rehearse the latest details and reports concerning the situation in Timor (see, e.g., Jim Dunn, *East Timor—Notes on the Humanitarian Situation,*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

September 1979, incorporated in *Hansard* [Representatives] October 10, 1979). Nor will I waste your time analyzing in detail the dominant response of Australian and American government spokesmen, news media, and intellectual community to the ongoing atrocious realities. On the *material* level, the Australian and American governments continue to supply economic, technical, and military aid to Indonesia, the better to enable it to prosecute its campaign of subjugation through mass murder in Timor.

On the *ideological* level, the same pro-Indonesian apologetics continue unabated. On the one hand, we have Whitlam persisting in the pretense that he opposed the Indonesian invasion, while members of the Australian Labor Party disagree among themselves as to how many of them knew what Whitlam was up to in the pre-invasion period. At the same time, members of the Fraser government compete to outdo the Orwellian obscenities of *To Build a Better Tomorrow in East Timor,* the 22-page color booklet distributed by the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra (just hours after the publication of the graphic Peter Rodgers photos of starving Timorese at Laga), in which the fruits of Indonesia's civilizing contribution to the health, prosperity, and freedom of its Timorese beneficiaries since 1975 are detailed, along with photos of laughing, frolicking, well-fed Timorese children.

Thus on May 22, 1979, Prime Minister Fraser informed Parliament that the Indonesian government was going "to very great lengths to advance the cause and well being" of the Timorese people; while more recently, in a parliamentary debate on Timor, Government spokesman David Connolly could say: "There is no nation on earth which has equalled our record of helping the people of East Timor, except the Indonesians." (*Sydney Morning Herald,* November 14, 1979)

Such appeasement and apologetics concerning Timor remain equally characteristic of the academic community (concerning which, see my *East Timor Apologetics: The Bankruptcy of Liberal Scholarship,* available from the Adelaide University Politics Department).

As for the news media, I will mention just two recent symptoms of its dominant conformist self-censorship. The first is the uncritical acceptance and presentation of the Rodgers reports. Without exception (excluding the left-wing press) there has been uncritical publication, acceptance, and repetition of Peter Rodgers' demonstrably untenable presentation of the latest official Indonesian propaganda concerning

- the number of Timorese killed since the invasion;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- the dimensions of the present starvation and medical deprivation (sickness and disease) problem;
- the reasons for aid-relief's not getting through;
- the cause of both the Timorese deaths and the present desperate condition of the remaining population (in Rodgers' presentation, the explanation is Indonesian benign inefficiency and benevolent inadvertence; for a detailed refutation of Rodgers' reports, see my *East Timor Apologetics*).

A second recent symptom was the near-complete failure on the part of Australian news media to report, let alone comment on or analyze, the successful United Nations resolution, based on a report of the UN Committee on Decolonization, condemning the Indonesian invasion and presence in Timor (see *Canberra Times,* November 4, 1979). Australia and the United States led the "Free World" support for Indonesia. A letter by Bruce McFarlane and myself to the Melbourne *Age* protesting its silence over the UN vote was declined. Instead came a long letter, "explaining" that the Chief Foreign Sub-Editor was "at the time somewhat preoccupied with the seizure of the American Embassy in Teheran," and a set of clippings including the Rodgers articles and photos, in righteous exoneration of the *Age's* stand on Timor.

We wrote back (November 20) requesting 1,000 words to refute the Rodgers presentation of the latest Indonesian propaganda "line." We have yet to receive a reply.

In short: the dominant response by government politicians and bureaucrats, academics and news media, continues to be apologetic business as normal.

The Final Solution. The urgent, essential, and terrible question thus remains: What can we do, in the prevailing conditions of collaboration, apologetics, and appeasement, to prevent the Indonesian Final Solution of the East Timorese "problem"? I would like to conclude these remarks with these suggestions.

First, there have been recent reports of renewed American Congressional interest in Timor, including the possibility of renewed Congressional hearings. In the circumstances, we should saturate progressive American Congressmen with analyses, information, and petitions concerning the necessity for such Congressional investigations. Only the United States, as Indonesia's guiding partner and senior collaborator, has the power to call a halt to the Indonesian "incorporation through subjugation" campaign.

Second, Senator Edward Kennedy in particular has been very critical recently of the Carter administration over Timor (see *The*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Australian, November 21, 1979). Kennedy doubtless has his own motives for choosing Timor as a stick with which to beat Carter, as the 1980 Presidential campaign begins. Despite this, however, we should flood Kennedy in particular with information, analyses, and demands for renewed Congressional hearings into the continuing Timor genocide.

My *third* suggestion is that CIET urgently request the Russell Peace Foundation to instigate a Russell Tribunal investigation into the role of Australia, the United States, and Indonesia in the criminal annexation and subjugation of Timor, along the lines of earlier Russell Tribunal investigations of gross crimes and human-rights violations in the case of Vietnam, Chile, and West Germany.

My *fourth* and final proposal is the most important for us here tonight. There is an urgent need for action now in Australia, bypassing the conformist or collaborationist establishment institutions. I propose that we immediately establish a Citizens Tribunal inquiry into the war crimes and crimes against humanity of Australian, Indonesian, and United States officials since 1975. Our procedures and principles should be those established by the Allies at Nuremberg and Tokyo (codified into the Nuremberg Principles of 1950), plus the several United Nations Conventions concerning genocide. Bypassing the prevailing bankrupt Australian political and intellectual institutions, such a Citizens Tribunal can best focus world attention on the essential immediate need: to prevent the Indonesian Final Solution of the East Timorese people.

The dominant response among academics, news media, and government spokesmen in this country is that the Indonesian "incorporation" of Timor is past, finished, history, and that the only "realistic" response is to forget or ignore what has happened and is happening. But it is not merely the reports of continuing FRETILIN resistance and motions of condemnation by the United Nations which make this "accept and forget" attitude intolerable both in principle and in practice. The almost certain result of such appeasement of Indonesia will be further genocide.

Never has our duty to denounce the crime of silence and to act and succeed in mobilizing the (selective) conscience and intellect of the Western world been more imperative. Nothing less can stop the Indonesian attempted Final Solution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We don't boycott the issues.

Not since the '30s have Americans experienced such severe social and economic problems. Yet our major newspapers and periodicals have made it their business to avoid serious discussion of corporate responsibility for this situation.

IF you're tired of this boycott of the causes of inflation, the energy crisis and unemployment.

IF you aren't satisfied merely knowing what's wrong and want to know what people are doing about it.

IF you want to choose from a variety of views; and care enough to take sides—then subscribe to *In These Times.*

We're the independent socialist newsweekly with a commitment to innovative, reliable journalism, to diversity of opinion, and to democratic social change.

First Issue Free!

IN THESE TIMES

The Independent Socialist Newspaper

SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY OFFER! SEND NO MONEY!

Full Refund Guarantee

☐ Send IN THESE TIMES for 6 trial months, Here's $9.95

☐ Send IN THESE TIMES for 1 year. Here's $19.00

☐ Bill me later

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

IN THESE TIMES REFUND GUARANTEE: If at any time you decide to cancel your subscription, we will send you a full refund for all the issues remaining on your subscription.

IN THESE TIMES 5615 W. Cermak Rd., Cicero, Ill. 60650 SX33

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHAT'S WITH CHINA'S UNINTERRUPTED REVOLUTION?

By O. Robertson

Mark Selden's article in the October 1979 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW, "China's Uninterrupted Revolution," has come at an opportune moment when most of us are confused over the dreadful antics going on in the socialist world. Regretfully though, his piece does not shed much light on China's new policies, and is totally unlike his previous work. His brilliant analysis in *The Yenan Way* set a new standard for China studies, compared with the John K. Fairbank Harvard school of imperialism which long dominated the postwar period. The essay is evasive and contradictory—even wildly inaccurate—in its criticism of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

Has the Chinese revolution been stalled? In light of the daily reversals of Maoist policy this seems to be a legitimate suspicion. Selden mentions the term "uninterrupted revolution" exactly twice in 13 pages, but no evaluation of this historic term or answer to the question is given. What are we to make of his assertion that "most of the original leadership generation . . . are no longer at the helm"? The average age of China's top leaders is 69, with some of them reaching into the eighties. Surely there can be no doubt as to the continuity of its leadership.

In closing his brief historical survey he cites three anti-Maoist examples currently in vogue in China, and admonishes the reader to regard them as "tendencies rather than established facts": (1) dependence on foreign technology; (2) "caricaturing the all-

O. Robertson is the pen name of an old communist (with a small c) and former civil-rights activist, who visited China in 1973 and 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

too-real shortcomings and excesses of the Cultural Revolution, rather than getting at the truth through factual analysis"; and (3) favoring elites.

Selden bypasses all the Marxist hair-splitting over the "uninterrupted revolution" and defines it simply as "China's century-long struggle for revolutionary change." Perhaps it's just as well. Even during my days of exuberant innocence, such terms as "permanent" or "uninterrupted" revolution seemed far out. The fact that one Leon Trotsky was known to be associated with it was reason enough for some of us to reject it unread.

It would be difficult enough to set up a socialist society in an advanced industrial system. But when Marxist formula is grafted onto developing countries barely out of their feudal stage the problem is obviously enormous. This I think is at the heart of the uninterrupted-revolution controversy in both Russia and China.

Revolutions are not begun by scientists or social engineers with laboratory-tested experiments and blueprints in hand to guide them; they are sloppy, cataclysmic, class eruptions. Their leaders, even when brilliant, are often specialists in polemics and the military arts. More often than not they play it by ear from day to day. But once the revolutionary regime is securely in power the experts seek to take over. They want a revolution which is orderly, with everyone slotted into their proper place. To build a bridge requires college-trained engineers, not "red" politicos. Schools of higher education with impeccable standards are needed to train them. And who are the authorities on building socialism? Why the Soviets of course!

Thus the elite, with its army of bureaucrats, intellectuals, and professionals, inevitably usurps power from the workers—in the name of socialism, the Party, and its pantheon of departed Marxists. Since rapid industrialization seems necessary, Western capitalist techniques and its exportable capital soon begin to look good, and a forced marriage of capitalist models and socialist principles takes place. Has not this been true of the two major socialist revolutions in the twentieth century?

The Chinese Communist victory in 1949 not only turned that nation around, it forced many of us to rethink the uses of Marxism-Leninism as a revolutionary tool. First, the socialist revolution was again occurring in the wrong place! Next, we were forced into accepting old terms with new meanings. In the USSR Leninism had seemed like a natural extension of Marxism. But Chairman Mao's aphorisms and gutsy peasant language, laced with ancient

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese parables and Marxian political analysis, was a new brand of wine.

In the early 1970s a group of young American social scientists—concerned Asian scholars—introduced us to new ways of understanding the Chinese revolution (a function carried out until then only by the *Guardian* and MONTHLY REVIEW). We were surprised to learn that Chairman Mao too had adopted the phrase "uninterrupted revolution" and had stretched it all the way back to the British Opium War of 1840. Both the Chairman and these scholars were quick to dissociate their version from Trotsky's, while naturally accepting Lenin's early flirtation with the term.

These writers—of whom Selden is or was one—were acutely aware of the difficulties of introducing socialism to a backward China with powerful enemies abroad. They empathized with Mao's experiments almost to a fault, with his lifelong struggles against the elite, the bureaucracy, and inequality as cancers inhibiting the full participation of the masses in struggles for their liberation. As experiments some were bound to fail or only half succeed. In 1960 the Soviet Union pulled its experts out of China, leaving many projects in shambles. Unlike Stalin, Mao did not cut down *en masse* those who opposed him. He hoped to destroy the bureaucracy without physical extermination.

His three major assaults on this enervating institution occurred in (1) the Cheng-Feng or Rectification Movement of 1942, (2) the Great Leap Forward, and (3) the Cultural Revolution. According to Selden's study, the first, while successful in many respects, utterly failed to limit the bureaucrats, who simply moved from the urban centers to the villages, remaining on the payroll. As for the other two, we are now told about "excesses" against innocent intellectuals and Communist Party cadre. Thus the Chairman pursued what now appears to have been a utopian goal. Or was it?

If communist bureaucrats, intellectuals with bourgeois habits, and the managerial class were impediments to a socialist breakthrough in Mao's time, what has changed to make them less so now? Selden's polite, subtle attack on Mao's policies ignores this question. How can anyone witnessing the dramatic reversal of all Mao's positions since his death in September 1976 still call it merely a "tendency"! There has been a 180-degree turn and China is back to one day before the Great Leap.

In his assault on this movement Selden says: "A single example will suffice: the 1958 harvest was at its peak when some 100 million peasants, at the behest of the party, marched off to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

make iron in indigenous furnaces. Nearly all the furnaces failed, shut down within a matter of months, but by that time it was too late to harvest the abandoned crops." Does anyone need to be reminded that only a few short years ago the exact opposite was being rapturously preached? What happened to the proletarianization of the countryside, taking the mystery out of steel-making, decentralization, and politics in command?

If 100 million were "marched off," this still left several hundred million farmers available for field work. And where were they herded off to? Everyone knows that these new iron-makers moonlighted in their backyards after a day's work in the fields nearby. Which version is correct: the old one or Selden's revisionist history?

Selden is now echoing the Chinese regime's latest propaganda slogan of "modernization." What are we to do with the plethora of anti-modernization works he and others of his school wrote? Shredding them will not hide the fact that modernization is by definition the use of capitalist technology and techniques and their active role in the socialist-building process. What world imperialism lost by military means they now gain through economic cooperation.

It is true that the Chinese are having second thoughts about massive infusions of foreign capital. But there is no such thing as being a little pregnant. These guys are playing with fire. Even now Japanese industrialists are studying what their role will be when China's steel production reaches world levels by the end of the century! Modernization is capitalism in action, its way of controlling the Third World.

Selden betrays an ethnocentrism almost too crass to believe. He asserts the usual boastful U.S. argument that "a modest family farm" in Illinois easily nets 500 times what 2,500 Chinese villagers produce. No one denies that American farming is more productive, more mechanized, less labor-intensive. But the picture Selden conjures up of a typical American family of presumably four—husband, wife, and two kids—breezing through a day's work, with hubby as the sole breadwinner, is pure nonsense. I am not familiar with the Midwest farm scene, but I'll wager that more than one person is employed in their busy seasons, if not all year round.

Then there are the thousands of workers who produce the tractors and other farm machinery, as well as additional thousands who service and maintain them; naturally these people are not counted in the census as farm workers. Nor are the competing farm-machine companies, their sales personnel, the grain markets in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chicago and on Wall Street. The million-man haulers of farm produce are called teamsters, while in China they still remain "peasants." There are also the cooperative bureaucracies, the veterinarians, the synthetic-fertilizer makers and forage growers—none of these appendages of the farm are called farmers. But be sure to add them to the Chinese peasant population!

During my two recent trips to China, I too saw model village communes. It was a far cry from the Selden account. Their most fascinating characteristic was the diversity of produce. Garden farming is but one source of income for them. Besides the principal crop, there are commercial fish ponds, pearl cultivation, afforestation and forest products, orchards, livestock breeding, brickmaking, vegetables for sale in local markets, machine workshops, handicrafts, and yes! an occasional ironworks. These are literally self-contained communities with little shops, the usual social services we have heard so much about—and people of diverse interests and occupations happily cooperating with each other. It was a beautiful scene with much to teach us if we were not so terribly chauvinistic.

Are there communes which do not fit this idyllic picture? Of course there are. But it is the model ones which indicate what's happening and what the trend is. This is what is coming into being and how to judge progress in China. As more labor is profitably employed in side industries there, modern farm machinery will be on its way. To say less about the Chinese countryside is to distort it and come up with Selden's invidious comparison.

However, mistakes in basic policy are being made in China. It is equally a mistake to ignore them because the Chinese oppose such critical evaluations. American workers have a role to play in changing the world, which cannot be adequately accomplished if China collaborates with American imperialism. Why have Selden and the present Chinese leadership gone so far astray? In part neither has an adequate definition of what constitutes socialism. It is taken for granted that everyone knows what it is. Or that somewhere Karl Marx explained it; needless to say, the difficulty with applying his definition is that he had the contradictions of an industrialized England in mind, not rural China.

Socialism is not a utopian's dream. It comes into being when the conflicts and contradictions between workers and their bosses are so out of whack that only the removal of the latter from power can solve them. When communists consciously take power before capitalist productivity has run its course, they must realize that while capitalists are not there physically, their ideology remains

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and permeates everyone; this is especially true for elites and bureaucracies.

Mao grappled with these problems for most of his adult life. He is accused by Selden of "excesses." Others have labeled him as a meddling extremist and a utopian visionary. Selden even claims that he imposed "revolutionary" change from above on a population not yet ready for it and hence was bound to fail, since it violated Mao's own unique mass-line concept. The choice of language sounds like a teachers' union tirade against black community control.

If pressed, they would have to define socialism as little more than the public ownership of the means of production, national planning, and increased production for "a better life." Thus defined, this brand of socialism allows for every kind of evil we have witnessed since 1918. I have no pat definition to offer. But surely socialism must encompass a rise in equality and a decline of state power. Both mean direct working-class control. Now one does not expect instant socialism, but the trend must be in this direction. Such is not the case in China today or, for that matter, anywhere else.

The bottom line in any definition of socialism is: What do the workers get out of it? How are they treated? How much real authority do they have? Who decides policy, wages, and working conditions? Chinese workers did not decide to raise consumer prices recently for the necessities they buy. The workers read about the return to the free market in the press just as we did. It was party bureaucrats in search of ready capital to pay for foreign-built hotels, technology, and the "modernization" of their armed forces. This Polish-style version of socialism can occur only when workers are stripped of their decision-making rights.

Since Marx did not lay out any blueprints for developing socialism in underdeveloped countries, Mao hit on the idea of muzzling the elite both in and out of the party, thus strengthening workers and farmers in this decision-making process. Decentralizing the economy served myriad purposes: it made the nation less vulnerable to military attack; it stripped the bureaucrats in the center of authoritarian power. Yes, it also messed up the gathering of economic data! A small price to pay. Conversely, with power devolving down below there were bound to be mistakes, perhaps enormous ones. This was the same dilemma Lenin faced in the early years of the Russian Revolution. He chickened out and turned to the old bureaucracy when it became evident that workers had not yet acquired the experience or the "culture" to manage

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industry. But Mao's confidence in the strength and intelligence of the people down below was so unbounded that he called it an atom bomb waiting to be released.

The situation in China was even worse than I have described. Chinese traditional respect for authority and the aged literally forced Mao into the Cultural Revolution to break this psychological barrier. The placing of dunce-caps on intellectuals and respected elder statesmen is the root source of claims made today of "all-too-real shortcomings and excesses of the Cultural Revolution."

A key element in Mao's insights was his promotion of egalitarianism. He knew that workers and farmers, if permitted, will practice egalitarianism. Sharing the little they have is second nature to them. When have they ever not known the meaning of sacrifice? It is the elite, expecting more for brain power, who had to be kept in line. If this individualist philosophy could be arrested for just one day (the Cultural Revolution did it for 10 years), then it shows the positive potential of human nature. Giving in to the base, material interests of the elite bodes no good for a developing country attempting to establish socialism.

Implicit in the criticism of the Chairman is his alleged violation of the "objective" Marxian laws of social change. The dogma has persisted that socialism in its early stage absolutely must have inequalities of various kinds. The most common example is "bourgeois right" in wage differentials. It is alleged that this will disappear, wither away along with the state, in due time as productivity increases. This excuse for perpetuating the exploitation of workers might have had some validity in the early years of the Russian Revolution when they didn't know any better. But surely the ensuing years have shown how easy it is to perpetuate unnecessary evils. First it is an acceptable, eight-grade wage differential. Then Stakhanovite and piecework methods slip in, followed by "free" work days, and ending with one-man rule in the factories to ensure discipline. As long as direction comes from above there is no end to these ploys to rip off the worker and the consumer. In capitalist manufacturing they call it built-in obsolescence.

In this connection orthodox Marxists, whether Chinese or Russian, treat social laws as if they were biblical injunctions. Everyone knows that if you jump off the roof of a tenement something awful will happen to you. Believe it or not, these Marxists seem never to have heard of the parachute or the airplane! If Marx's genius lay in discovering social laws, the problem for Marxist scholars is to manipulate these social laws exactly as it is done every day in the physical sciences.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The temptation is overwhelming to simply dismiss Selden's new views as resembling those of the people who follow the regime of their choice whether right or wrong. But what are the priorities of this new cult of Teng supporters? Selden says, "The priorities of the current era [!] include: the furthering of the democratic process; rebuilding the party . . . and ensuring higher living standards among the rural population." What is the significance of furthering the democratic process? Is it more freedom for the workers to make decisions? No. He admits this has been curtailed—even if at the moment it is only a "tendency"! Its meaning lies in the ability of the intellectuals to go to court if necessary to protect themselves from alleged political harassment à la Cultural Revolution. Simply stated, Selden wants to protect his class interests, not those of workers.

For a long time I had the mistaken idea that all Sinologists, whether progressive or imperialist, had one thing in common: they were much too abstract. Even those who spewed State Department policy covered it with an air of objectivity. But our friends were just as bad. There was nothing to learn from them which was applicable to the American workers' cause. I cannot recall Lenin ever writing anything which did not have a direct bearing on *his* revolution. Our China experts, like Egyptologists who dig under pyramids to decipher hieroglyphics, seemed unconcerned about the American scene. Since the focus was on a faraway backward country, their studies of the Chinese revolution were just an exciting adventure. Like reading a novel or watching TV. After you're finished you go to bed.

SOCIAL PRACTICE

A Special Issue on The Politics of Education

edited by

Henry A. Giroux

Featuring: Aronowitz on education and technocratic rationality; Greene on politics of the concrete; Purpel on docility; Giroux on reproduction and resistance in classroom pedagogy; Anyon on curriculum, political/social structure, and social change; Whitty on the new sociology of education; Apple and Teitelbaum on curriculum and the politics of the labor process.

Spring 1980 **Price $1** **Box 211, Winfield, Ill. 60190**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IS CHINA'S "UNINTERRUPTED REVOLUTION" A MARXIST REVOLUTION?

By Harry Grundfest

Mark Selden's article (October 1979) summarizes, if rather circumspectly, the tortuous paths of domestic policies in the Chinese leaders' efforts to raise the level of life and culture of a predominantly primitive peasant economy in a fantastically crowded land. Implicitly, Selden's title also notes the growing doubts as to the verity (or sanity?) of Chinese Marxism.

According to Selden, one of China's domestic priorities is to restore the credibility of the Chinese Communist Party. Is it possible today to restore credibility in the eyes of international socialism to the "free world's" new-found "good communists?" A revolution is Marxist not only by virtue of its domestic goals and achievements. It must also make its appropriate contributions to internationalism, as Marx and Engels stressed from earliest days.

The threats of world war and possible holocaust become more and more imminent as imperialism finds itself increasingly at bay. Yet China's leaders are stridently encouraging militaristic adventures by the United States; egging on the NATO partners against détente with the Soviet Union; backing Third World dictators in Chile, Zaire, Morocco; denouncing Cuba's actions of international solidarity in Angola and Ethiopia; and crowning these with a war (and another apparently on the way) to "teach Vietnam a lesson."

What else but abandonment of a *Marxist* revolution can explain these actions? If there is an explanation consistent with socialist imperatives I have failed to find it in the pages of MR or elsewhere.

Harry Grundfest is a member of the Department of Neurology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARK SELDEN RESPONDS

The bottom line for O. Robertson is this: "American workers have a role to play in changing the world which cannot be adequately accomplished if China collaborates with American imperialism." And again, referring to the work of Sinologists in general and my article in particular, "There was nothing to learn from them which was applicable to the American workers' cause." There is much to be learned from the victories and defeats of the Chinese revolution, but a Maoist fundamentalism which seeks magical solutions for America in strategies derived from concrete conditions in China's villages or which ignores the painful choices imposed on peripheral nations by the international system is doomed to irrelevance, disillusion, or worse.

I would like to take the opportunity provided by Robertson's polemic to consider further the relationship among revolutionary change, economic development, and socialist democracy as illustrated by Chinese experience of the past thirty years.

Since the 1960s, inspired in part by the Chinese revolution as well as by the civil rights, women's, and anti-war movements, Western Marxist and radical understanding of the socialist transition has riveted on such problems as mass mobilization, egalitarian distribution, and cultural revolution. This focus on relations of production and superstructure represented a swing (as sharp as any of those which we observe in the pendulum of Chinese politics) away from orthodox perspectives on the transition popularized by Stalin and his successors in the Soviet Union. At the heart of this orthodoxy was the belief that, given state ownership and planning in pursuit of industrialization, all else would follow automatically. There was no necessity to examine concretely the living horrors committed in the name of socialism.

The experience of the Chinese revolution, as summed up by Mao Zedong, provided the most compelling critique of such theories of the productive forces and of the automaticity of the transition: to postpone to a distant communist utopia the institutionali-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zation of worker control at the point of production, to curb class/bureaucratic privilege and eliminate exploitation of the countryside by the city was to create the preconditions for state despotism, not for a liberating socialism.

I share with Robertson the view that at the heart of socialism must be the progressive mastery of working people over the immediate workplace and increasingly over all aspects of social experience, as well as a deep concern about current Chinese policies. But, in the name of Mao Zedong and following the lead of Charles Bettelheim, he has "transcended Marx" in denigrating the importance of material preconditions for achieving the promise of socialism. Perhaps this is a luxury which Western intellectuals and activists can afford in considering the future of their own overdeveloped countries. Chinese and Third World revolutionaries cannot. This mode of analysis, moreover, which rests its case on theoretical propositions divorced from the historical process, obscures understanding of the events in China in recent decades. I would like, therefore, to consider briefly the issue in both its theoretical and Chinese contexts. To anticipate one conclusion: A socialism of shared poverty must surely give way to one of common prosperity, or (whatever its slogans) move towards increasing state repression and eventually its own destruction.

Perhaps no revolutionary ever addressed this issue more astutely than did Mao in his writings and leadership between 1943 and 1955. At the heart of his understanding of domestic issues geared to national liberation and the socialist transition was a vision of mobilization politics (the mass line) which rested on the belief that *at each stage,* given appropriate leadership, the strivings of the vast majority would propel the revolution forward. This presupposed two critical strictures on the pace and practice of revolution: First, change could not proceed much faster than people's consciousness or their desire for change. And second, revolutionary change must contribute to economic development *and* demonstrate its ability to improve the livelihood of the great majority.

The popular dynamic of the Chinese revolution in the countryside through the liberation war, the land revolution, and early cooperative formation rested on the achievement of this promise. Revolution demonstrably eliminated some of the most murderous forms of exploitation and improved the livelihood of the great majority of the people. Mao reiterated this proposition in July 1955 in his speech on cooperative transformation, touching off the "socialist upsurge" in the countryside. Having defined the Chinese road to socialism in the countryside in terms of voluntary peasant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization based on mutual benefit through successive stages of mutual aid, smaller to larger cooperatives, and collectives, he concluded:

> These steps make it possible for the peasants gradually to raise their socialist consciousness through personal experience and gradually to change their mode of life, thus lessening the feeling of abrupt change. Generally, these steps can avoid a fall in crop production during, say, the first year or two; indeed they must insure an increase each year, and this can be done.

China's swift collectivization in 1956 virtually without the bloodshed which accompanied Soviet collectivization, the impressive overall achievements of Chinese rural policy, and the persuasiveness of Mao's construction of the party's history have tended to obscure one important fact. Beginning in the "socialist upsurge"–Great Leap Forward period of 1955-60, China abandoned the practice of advance by stages based on voluntary participation, strengthened community bonds, and mutual benefit, at considerable cost, which we are only now beginning to perceive.

Thrusting aside the painstaking tasks of creating viable cooperatives capable of sustaining voluntary participation through their ability to produce and reward their members, a task requiring gradual advance by stages and long-term education of 400 million petty commodity producers, in less than a year China accomplished collectivization throughout the countryside. Land and most draught animals passed from individual to collective ownership without compensation. How was this "miracle" accomplished, and at what cost? For a significant portion of the middle peasants, perhaps roughly 25 percent of the entire rural population, collectivization meant a significant decline in income. Many of these, perhaps a majority, had no cooperative experience prior to this time. (Indeed, in south and central China land revolution had only recently ended and cooperative experience of any kind was limited.) For them, the entry into "socialism" (i.e., collective farming) undoubtedly carried significant overtones of expropriation. Overall, it appears that the upsurge was accomplished at the sacrifice of a significant part of the democratic and popular quality of earlier mass movements; it produced a growing gap between the center and the villages. The problem, moreover, intensified during the Leap as the center imposed on the peasants demands which could not be fulfilled and transmitted reports of accomplishments increasingly divorced from reality. Despite this, and despite the complex problems of cooperative administration and remuneration, the sys-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tem did not disintegrate even under the strains of the depression of the early sixties.

We must nevertheless consider whether the Cultural Revolution's analysis of the history of the People's Republic of China in terms of "the two lines," a socialist and a capitalist road, is not in fact more obfuscating than helpful. We must also consider whether the decline in rural growth rates in the two decades after 1957 can be understood exclusively or even primarily in terms of Soviet perfidy and the vagaries of drought and flood. How significant were the strains placed on the system by mobilization approaches which abandoned earlier mass-line methods? This is a task which will not be resolved by counterposing slogans.

Two decades after liberation, the predominant political tone of the Cultural Revolution was one of demanding belt-tightening and self-sacrifice for such abstract goals as attacking "capitalist roaders." This contrasts sharply with the promise of mutual prosperity which lay behind the land revolution and early cooperation. The language of egalitarian practice and intense mobilization of the Cultural Revolution raised expectations but did little to eliminate hierarchical division and pockets of privilege. Though the pockets could sometimes be found in different pants, arbitrary uses of power actually increased with the total breakdown of institutional norms and the disintegration of the party. For working people who saw socialism as the bridge to a better material life in an egalitarian society, this surely presented a dilemma.

Among Mao's primary theoretical contributions was his appreciation of a central problem of the transition. Socialist ownership, including both collective and state ownership, while making possible rational planning for the development of the productive forces and the reduction of inequities, immensely strengthens centralized power of the state and party over economic, political, and social life. Part of the genius of cooperative forms as the centerpiece of the Chinese strategy of the transition, worked out in the years 1943 to 1955, lay in their promise to reduce the power of the center and the bureaucracy by placing substantial resources and authority in local production and political units. More than any other communist political leader in power, Mao was sensitive to this issue: "It is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and local authorities than from one source alone," he insisted. "We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities and denying them the right to independent action." It cannot be said,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, that the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution successfully put these goals into practice in ways which advanced the transition. On balance, specific innovations such as the barefoot doctors and cooperative health systems aside, I have come increasingly to believe that the reverse may well be true. The real issue here goes beyond the question of economic dislocation to questions of socialist democracy. The time is at hand to reassess the writings and the political practice of Mao, his allies and enemies in the Cultural Revolution, to separate hyperbole from fact, from this and other new perspectives.

In practice, both the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution, by juxtaposing the people's livelihood and revolutionary change (the demand for sacrifice) rather than seeing them as mutually reinforcing, and by implying that China could dispense with administrators and technical personnel contributed to the subsequent reaction with its emphasis on technological and administrative prerogatives, individual material incentives, and profit criteria for enterprises, all on the promise of rising incomes. Countries in the early stages of the transition can ill afford the luxury of the perspective—advanced by and mirroring the dominant tendency of the Cultural Revolution —which recognizes in administrators and intellectuals only their bureaucratic tendencies and not the potential importance of their contributions, which sees the cities and urban people only as the enemy of the countryside, and which advocates only strategies of struggle and not of unity.

This conclusion does not justify a theory of productive forces which freezes social relations in the name of economic efficiency. It suggests rather the necessity to recognize that the economic stimulus provided by revolutionary change apparent in the land revolution and initial phases of cooperation is unlikely to be repeated at current levels of production and technology, and that genuinely revolutionary change must rest on processes which promise to improve the livelihood of the great majority if they are to avoid the pitfalls of state despotism. It suggests, furthermore, that the strategy articulated by Mao through the mid-fifties of integrating middle and rich peasants and intellectuals into the polity, rather than all-out struggle against them, has much to commend it for a developing socialist society.

Robertson expresses a number of legitimate concerns about China's present direction, including the dangers of wholesale import of Western capital and technology and the large-scale domestic distortions which it may engender. But the options are narrower,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the choices more painful, than he suggests. Certainly Mao, who described his 1950 negotiations with Stalin as taking meat from the jaws of a tiger and who long struggled to break the Western economic blockade, never cherished the illusion that China's future lay in isolation from the world economy.

Both Harry Grundfest and Robertson might prefer to believe that Mao consistently advocated (or should have advocated) that China simultaneously confront all the evils in the world beginning with U.S. and Soviet imperialisms. The experience of Mao's generation, well summed up in the 1940 statement "On Policy," postulated high principles but put forward rather more modest goals of survival. "The Communist Party opposes all imperialism, but we must make a distinction between Japanese imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the imperialist powers which are not doing so now. . . ." Mao put the matter again with characteristic bluntness in the early sixties (though not at the time for the public record). After observing that Soviet products not only were "heavy, awkward and overpriced but they hold something back," he observed that "it is better to do business with the French bourgeoisie who still have some business ethics."

The decision by the CCP leadership to marshal all resources to combat Japanese imperialism in China in the 1930s and 1940s, U.S. imperialism in the 1950s and 1960s, and Soviet social imperialism since 1969, inevitably cloaked in the garb of internationalism, represented the successive efforts of a nation seeking to create the space within which it was possible to survive and carry forward revolutionary change in a hostile and dangerous world. Official ideology has frequently blurred many of the most painful compromises which China's position of weakness has required. Chinese policies such as that of encouraging the forward thrust of NATO and U.S. militarists and that of invading Vietnam can be "understood" within this framework of Chinese perceptions of an overriding Soviet threat. They also can and should be criticized.

Thirty years after liberation China continued to share many of the problems of the peripheral nations. It is, nevertheless, important to note that the China of 1980 is not the China of 1949 in terms of class formations, economic structure, or ability to cope with foreign capital: a profound revolution has taken place, the foundations of socialist industrialization and cooperative agriculture are in place, and the ability to generate foreign exchange is substantially greater. This vitality is evident in the generally favorable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terms which China appears to have obtained in financial and trade negotiations with the United States and Japan which, for reasons of their own, now find it advantageous to encourage Chinese economic development in ways complementary to their own economies. The issue of foreign penetration nevertheless remains open both in terms of its extent and the ability of Chinese planners to control it and to utilize foreign capital and technology to spur socialist development. Volatile as it is, it is not a matter of being "a little bit pregnant." It is misleading to see the issue as one of all-or-nothing, an either/or issue. It is no accident that there has not yet been a regime which chose autarchy and survived to tell the tale. In China, as with earlier Soviet technological and financial inputs negated by Mao, it is the overall size and character of this activity and its relation to the domestic economy—as well as the internal costs of forgoing foreign technology—which require concrete analysis.*

In the end, Robertson is little interested in such mundane issues as whether there is a full pot of rice on the table (as opposed to how it is shared); whether running water replaces the shoulder pole and the outhouse, and whether farming relies principally on the hoe or the tractor (as opposed to who has which); whether incomes rise or fall (as opposed to their distribution). In part, I suspect, this is because he is content to generalize from theory and from the model units which both foreigners and Chinese visit and whose accomplishments are touted in the press. With few exceptions, these are not Potemkin villages. Though Mao's strategy in part rested on the presumption that through popularization their achievements could be generalized, it is, I believe, incorrect to assume that their numerous successes necessarily reveal to us the China of tomorrow. It is worth recalling the overall failure to replicate the experience of Mao's chosen model in 15 years of "Learning from Dazhai." Chinese figures suggest significant change in less than one seventh of them. The difficulty of generalizing the achievements of model units, both in their social relations and cooperative spirit and their material achievements, remains one of the great challenges of the present era. It is not and never has been a given.

---

* This discussion of China's international policy draws heavily on the work of Edward Friedman, particularly his article "On Maoist Conceptualizations of the Capitalist World System," *China Quarterly* 80 (December 1979), pp. 806-837.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Isn't it time for our analysis of the socialist transition to reunite these themes of economics and politics and to look beyond the pronouncements of the center to the experience of human beings at the grassroots?

Subscribe Now! Renew Now!

MONTHLY REVIEW

Special sub rates to students: $11 (foreign $13); £6·50

☐ 1 year $15 (foreign $18); £ 9·00

☐ 2 years $28 (foreign $33); £16·50

Libraries and institutions $24 (foreign $26); £13·00

Monthly Review
62 West 14th Street
New York, N.Y. 10011

Monthly Review
47 Red Lion Street
London WC1R 4PF,
England

I enclose $..... I enclose £.....

Please send me MONTHLY REVIEW for ☐ one year ☐ two years

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip .....

(Canadian subscribers must pay foreign rate)

SUBSCRIBERS: TO CHANGE YOUR ADDRESS

Please write us BEFORE you move, 60 days in advance if you can.

Mail to Sub. Dept., Monthly Review, 62 W. 14 St., NYC 10011

1. In this space, attach an OLD address label (or, if you don't have a label, give us your old address).

2. And in this space, please print carefully your NEW address.

Name

OLD address

City State Zip

Name

NEW address

City State Zip

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Continued from inside front cover)

Associates' income increased by 14 percent. This is a very gratifying record, the significance of which, however, must be judged against the distressing fact that the rate of inflation during the same period was little if any less than the increase in income. With inflation actually rising since the first of the year, MR's cash-flow position remains precarious. We urge all of you who have been planning to join the Associates but have not yet done so to act now.

Paul Sweezy is spending the month of May as a visiting professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Manchester, England. He commented on accepting the invitation that this marks his graduation from the economics profession, from which he departs without regrets.

There is an error in Margaret Fay's article "Marx and Darwin: A Literary Detective Story" (MR, March 1980) for which Paul Sweezy accepts responsibility, since the author had written to him shortly before her death in the summer of 1979 asking that the correction be made, and he neglected to do so (the article was already in type at that time). The first sentence (p. 54) of the paragraph beginning on line 17 reads: "Four months later . . . my publication was 'scooped' by Lewis S. Feuer, who had submitted a paper, bearing evident similarities to mine, to the *Annals of Science* in December 1974, a month after the *Journal of the History of Ideas* had received my manuscript." This last clause should read ". . . in the same month that the *Journal of the History of Ideas* had received my manuscript." Margaret explained that it was to *New Left Review* and not to JHI that she had submitted the *ms* in November, and she was anxious that the error be corrected.

The Midwest Marxist Scholars' Conference, now in its fifth successful year, has been emulated by the formation of the Eastern Marxist Scholars' Conference which will hold its annual meeting in New York at Hostos Community College (CUNY), October 17-19, 1980. The theme will be "Myths, Illusions, Realities: Marxist Critiques of Capitalist Culture in the United States." Prospective participants are invited to submit three copies of an abstract (no longer than 300 words) by June 1 if possible to: EMSC, Room 1201, 202 West 40th St., New York, NY 10018. Further information, including a list of specific topics, can be obtained from the same address.

Quite a few readers have written to complain of the lateness of recent issues of MR (we hope it will not be necessary to include this one). We are painfully aware of the problem and apologize to all concerned. The fault lies partly with us; partly with the printer, binder, and mailing house; and partly with the post office (there have been cases in which test mailings have taken as much as three weeks to reach a New York suburb, and no doubt it is worse at greater distances). We plan to take advantage of the double summer (July-August) issue which, barring bad luck, will go to the printer early this year, to get back on a more acceptable schedule. But please bear in mind that, given our very limited editorial and financial resources, some of the factors involved are beyond our control.

From time to time we receive a bequest from a reader who felt, in his or her lifetime, that financial support would help make possible the continuance of MR as a completely independent magazine. Any reader who may be moved to follow this example should be careful to state exactly, in the will, that the bequest is to "Monthly Review, Inc., presently of 62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011."

To our contributors: when submitting manuscripts, please send two copies. And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new from

Monthly Review Press

cloth titles

Agribusiness in the Americas by Roger Burbach and Patricia Flynn. This book provides an important contribution to understanding the political economy of world agriculture. Taking as its starting point the rise of corporate agriculture in the United States, the book goes on to analyze the global expansion of U.S. agribusiness transnationals.
Paperback: PB5368/$5.95/£3·25 Cloth: CL535X/$15.00/£8·00

Bureaucracy and the Labor Process: The Transformation of U.S. Industry, 1860-1920 by Dan Clawson. This book presents a historical analysis of the struggle between workers and capitalists for control over the labor process. What makes this book unique is the wealth of material documenting both workers' conscious struggle to control the labor process and capital's repeated efforts to undermine and finally supplant this control. Cloth: CL5422/$16.50/£8·95

The Intellectual Roots of Independence: An Anthology of Puerto Rican Political Essays edited by Iris M. Zavala and Rafael Rodríguez. For the first time in the English language, the outstanding Puerto Rican political essayists of the last 125 years have been collected in one volume.
Cloth: CL5201/$16.50/£8·95

Intervention and Conflict in the Horn of Africa by Bereket Habte Selassie. In this book, Bereket Selassie argues forcefully that in order to understand recent events in this strategically important area, it is necessary to understand both the role of the national question and the effect of outside intervention on the national struggles.
Cloth: CL5341/$15.00/£8·00

The Race for Resources: The Continuing Struggle Over Minerals and Fuels by Michael Tanzer. The aim of this extensive study is to provide the reader with a clear analysis, in nontechnical language, of the main features of the world's mineral situation focusing on the control of mineral resources among companies and countries, now and in the future.
Cloth: CL5406/$16.00/£8·75

now in paperback

The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change edited and with an introduction by Mark Selden. ". . . a comprehensive collection of materials on the Chinese revolution from 1946 to the present. The well-selected translations and the long introduction that precedes them provide a stimulating approach to many topics."—The NEW YORK TIMES
Paperback: PB5325/$10.00/£5·45 Cloth: CL4663/$20.00/£11·75

add 75¢ for the first book, 25¢ for each additional book when ordering by mail

62 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011 / 47 Red Lion Street, London WC1R 4PF

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED